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deferred acceptance algorithm, was adopted. Following a revealed preference ap-
proach, I estimate health professionals’ hospital preferences using the 2014 data.
Using these estimates and the fact that under the decentralized mechanism health
professionals were able to avoid positions that fall below their acceptance threshold,
I obtain the average marginal utility a health professional would require to accept
a position by simulating the outcome had the decentralized mechanism still been in
use. Then, I simulate the outcome of the centralized mechanism in the absence of
the requirement that students accept the assignment determined by the mechanism.
I find that, given the choice, about 30% of physicians would be left unassigned, im-
plying that it is important for the policy’s success that assignments be mandatory.
I review many algorithms that have been discussed in the literature and find some
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no evidence that manipulable mechanisms can yield a higher welfare gains.
ESSAYS IN CENTRALIZED MARKET ALLOCATIONS
by
Santiago Velez-Ferro
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment














This dissertation consists of three chapters. The main topic throughout this
dissertation is the lessons that can be drawn from the implementation of a centralized
clearinghouse to allocate health professionals to rural areas in Colombia. Chapter
1 explores the theoretical motivations of the clearinghouse. Paula Jaramillo and
Çaǧatay Kayı are coathors of that chapter. Chapter 2 is an empirical evaluation of
the implemented clearinghouse. Chapter 3 discusses the lessons that can be drawn
from the clearinghouse implemented for those used in the US that allocate students
to public schools. Chapter 4 discusses the aftermath of the allocation and concludes.
All errors are mine. The views expressed here are those from the author and do
not reflect the views of the Colombian Ministry of Health. I next summarize each
chapter.
In chapter 1, we study many–to–one matching problems where doctors have
strict preferences over hospitals, hospitals have strict preferences over sets of doc-
tors, and the law assigns priorities to hospitals over sets of doctors. A mechanism
assigns a matching between doctors and hospitals. We are interested in mecha-
nisms that respect priority, are efficient and immune to strategic behavior, and
minimize unfilled positions. We show that the mechanisms that have been used
recently in Colombia do not satisfy any of these desirable properties. We consider
three mechanisms proposed in the literature: the deferred acceptance mechanism,
the immediate acceptance mechanism (so-called Boston mechanism), and the top
trading cycle mechanism. We explore different versions of efficiency, namely doctor–
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efficiency, efficiency, and priority constrained–efficient. We find that all these mech-
anisms are priority constrained–efficient and they minimize unfilled positions. As
expected, the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycle mecha-
nism are strategy–proof but the immediate acceptance mechanism is not. We show
that the deferred acceptance mechanism always assigns a matching that is priority
constrained–efficient and respects priority although it is neither doctor–efficient nor
efficient. On the other hand, the top trading cycles mechanism and the immediate
acceptance mechanism are doctor–efficient, but do not respect priority.
In chapter 2, I evaluate the centralized clearinghouse implemented through
the mechanism motivated in the previous chapter as a policy tool. A long-standing
policy concern in many countries is the difficulty of filling medical positions in ru-
ral areas. In Colombia, the Ministry of Health requires newly-graduated health
professionals to work in a rural or marginalized urban area for a year in order to
receive professional certification. The decentralized mechanism used until 2013 to
allocate graduates to slots was one that health professionals could manipulate to
avoid an assignment. In 2014, a single-offer centralized mechanism that cannot be
manipulated to avoid an assignment, based on Gale and Shapley’s deferred accep-
tance algorithm, was adopted. Following a revealed preference approach, I estimate
health professionals’ hospital preferences using the 2014 data. Using these estimates
and the fact that under the decentralized mechanism health professionals were able
to avoid positions that fall below their acceptance threshold, I obtain the average
marginal utility a health professional would require to accept a position by simulat-
ing the outcome had the decentralized mechanism still been in use. Then, I simulate
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the outcome of the centralized mechanism in the absence of the requirement that
students accept the assignment determined by the mechanism. I find that, given
the choice, about 30% of physicians would be left unassigned, implying that it is im-
portant for the policy’s success that assignments be mandatory. One feature of the
centralized mechanism is that, in the case of multiple individuals having the same
priority for a particular position, the tie is broken randomly. I show that breaking
the ties in favor of those who listed a specific hospital as preferred can yield welfare
gains of up to 12%. Finally, I show that moving from the random lottery to a merit-
based tie-break, based on the results of the examination that health professionals
take at the completion of their studies, raises inequality concerns.
In chapter 3, I revisit a long standing debate in the way how students are allo-
cated to public/charter schools in many districts in the US. In particular within the
school choice literature, the Immediate Acceptance and Deferred Acceptance (DA)
mechanisms are defined as different algorithms. I develop a framework in which
these mechanisms differ only in the priority structure. When “rank-based priority
relations” are added on top of the DA mechanism’s priorities the Immediate Accep-
tance mechanism is obtained. This framework naturally suggests a new mechanism;
the one obtained by adding rank priorities below DA’s priorities. Using the utilities
of each professional at each hospital estimated in the previous chapter, I calculate
the aggregate welfare for each mechanism. I find no evidence of a possible welfare
increase when moving to a manipulable algorithm.
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Chapter 1: Matching Problems with Priorities and Preferences: Com-
pulsory Social Service Allocation in Colombia
This chapter1 studies two-sided many–to–one matching markets where doctors
have strict preferences over hospitals, hospitals have strict preferences over sets of
doctors, and the law assigns priorities to hospitals over doctors.
There are many real–life two-sided many–to–one matching markets. Two im-
portant instances are the national resident matching program and student assign-
ment system to public schools. The former is an entry-level matching market for
hospitals and medical school graduates in the United States where doctors have strict
preferences over hospitals and hospitals have strict preferences over sets of doctors.
The latter is the public school match where students have strict preferences over
schools and the law assigns priorities to schools over students.
Many real–life matching markets employ centralized mechanisms to match stu-
dents to hospitals and the only information that the matchmaker asks from each
participating agent is the preference over the other side of the market. In particular,
we assume that the agents’ quotas (i.e., the number of available positions) are com-
monly known by the agents. In practice, agents are only allowed to submit ordered
1This chapter is co-authored with Paula Jaramillo and Çaǧatay Kayı
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lists of individual partners. Throughout the chapter we focus on mechanisms that
only demand ordered lists of potential individual partners.
An assignment between doctors and hospitals is called a matching. A mech-
anism assigns a matching to each problem. Next, we describe desirable properties
of mechanisms. First, we are interested in mechanisms that respect priority, i.e.,
for each problem, the mechanism assigns a matching such that there is no doctor–
hospital pair such that they are not mates in the matching but the doctor would
prefer to be matched to the hospital and the hospital has unfilled positions or is
matched to another doctor who has a lower priority for the hospital. Second, we
are interested in a set of properties related to Pareto-efficiency. A mechanism is
doctor–efficient if for each problem, the mechanism assigns a matching such that
there is no other matching such that each doctor finds it at least as desirable and at
least one doctor prefers. A mechanism is efficient if for each problem, the mecha-
nism assigns a matching such that there is no other matching such that each agent
finds it at least as desirable and at least one agent prefers. A mechanism is priority
constrained–efficient if for each problem, the mechanism assigns a matching such
that there is no other matching that respects priority such that each agent finds it
at least as desirable and at least one agent prefers. The third property is strategy–
proofness, i.e., no doctor should benefit from misrepresenting his preferences. The
last property is minimizing unfilled positions, i.e., for each problem, the mechanism
assigns a matching such that there is no doctor–hospital pair such that the hospital
has unfilled positions but the doctor is not matched to any hospital.
2
1.1 Compulsory Social Service Allocation in Colombia
The compulsory social service allocation of medical doctors in Colombia was
created to tackle the problems of inequality in allocation of doctors to rural areas
in Colombia. The allocation is decided and implemented by the Ministry of Health.
The Colombian law and the regulations of the Ministry of Health impose a
priority relation over doctors. Some priorities are being an indigenous, being a
“raizal” (native of Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina),
being pregnant, being a mother or a father with small children, being a doctor with
impairments or disabilities, being a doctor who needs a special treatment. The
Colombian law has two classes of priorities. First, a doctor who is “raizal” has a
priority at the hospitals in the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa
Catalina. Second, a doctor who is indigenous has a priority at the hospitals in the
indigenous regions. The regulations of the Ministry of Health have also two classes
of priorities. First, a doctor who is a mother with small children has a priority at any
hospital. Second, a doctor who has impairments or disabilities, or needs a special
medical treatment. Also, the Colombian law take precedence over the regulations of
the Ministry of Health. For example, a doctor who is a “raizal” has a priority over
a doctor who is a mother with small children at the hospitals in the Archipelago
of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina. Similar precedence takes place
for indigenous doctors. However, a doctor who is a mother with small children, or
who has impairments or disabilities, or who needs a special medical treatment has
priority over other doctor at any hospital.
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The mechanism has been used to allocate doctors since 2012 is a lottery for
each state (departamento) of Colombia. Each doctor enrolls in a state and a lottery
assigns the enrolled doctors to a hospital in that state. The doctors that are not
assigned to any hospital are exempt from the compulsory social service. In 2013,
the ministry changed the mechanism by putting enrollment limits for each state. In
each state, the number of enrolled doctors cannot be more than the double of the
total available positions in that state. It was a first-come first-serve basis and the
doctors who could not enroll to their favourite state have to choose another state
to enroll in. Once again, after the enrollment, at each state, a lottery assigns the
enrolled doctors to a hospital in that state. The doctors that are not assigned to













Jan. 2012 Apr. 2012 Jul. 2012 Oct. 2012** Jan. 2013**
Figure 1.1: Filled positions, unfilled positions, and unassigned doctors in the mech-
anisms used by the Ministry of Health in 2012 and 2013.
These mechanisms created many problems. First, although the number of
positions are smaller than the number of doctors, there are always unfilled positions
(Figure 1.1). Second, the doctors do not have incentives to reveal their preferences
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truthfully and they coordinate to be exempt from the social service (Figure 1.2).
Third, some doctors reject the allocation assigned by the mechanism since they
cannot live in some states because of health problems or being mothers.
1.1.1 Overview of the Results
To analyze compulsory social service allocation of medical doctors in Colom-
bia, we study a combination of many–to–one matching problem and school choice
problem where each doctor can work for at most one hospital and each hospital can
hire at most the number of positions it offers. Each doctor has a strict preference
over hospitals and being exempt, each hospital has strict preferences over sets of
doctors and being unmatched, and the Colombian law or the Ministry of Health
assigns priorities to hospitals over doctors.
For the compulsory social service allocation of medical doctors in Colombia,
we consider Gale and Shapley (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm incorporating
the preferences of the doctors and the priorities dictated by the Colombian law or
the Ministry of Health. This mechanism solves three aforementioned problems. The
incorporation of priorities allows doctors with disabilities, doctors who are mothers
with small children, or doctors with indigenous origins to have a priority over other
doctors in the hospitals to which they apply. The doctors have incentives to reveal
their true preferences. Also, if the number of positions are smaller than the number
of doctors, there are no unfilled positions. The mechanism minimizes the number
of unfilled positions.
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We also consider the immediate acceptance mechanism (so-called Boston mech-
anism) and the top trading cycle mechanism. We find that all these mechanisms
are priority constrained–efficient and they minimize unfilled positions. We show
that the deferred acceptance mechanism always assigns a matching that is prior-
ity constrained–efficient and respects priority although it is neither doctor–efficient
nor efficient. On the other hand, the top trading cycles mechanism and the im-
mediate acceptance mechanism are doctor–efficient, but do not respect priority. As
expected, the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycle mechanism
are strategy–proof but the immediate acceptance mechanism is not.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we de-
scribe the model. Section 1.3, we present our results. The results in this chapter
advocate the use of the Gale and Shapley’s deferred acceptance mechanism in the
setting mentioned above.
1.2 Model
There are two finite and disjoint sets of agents: a set of doctors D and a set
of hospitals H . Let I = D ∪H be the set of agents. We denote a generic doctor,
hospital, and agent by d, h, and i, respectively. For each hospital h, there is an
integer quota qh ≥ 1 that represents the number of positions it offers. Each doctor
d can work for at most one hospital and each hospital h can hire at most qh doctors.
Let q = (qh)h∈H . For each i ∈ I, the set of potential partners of agent i is denoted
by Ni. If i ∈ D, Ni = H and if i ∈ H, Ni = D.
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Each doctor d has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation Pd
over the hospitals and the prospect of “being exempt”, which is denoted by ∅. For
h, h′ ∈ H ∪ {∅}, we write hPd h′ if doctor d prefers h to h′ (h 6= h′), and hRd h′ if
d finds h at least as good as h′, i.e., hPd h
′ or h = h′. Note that for each doctor,
each hospital is acceptable but a doctor may prefer being exempt to working for a
hospital.2 Let PD = (Pd)d∈D be the preference profile for the doctors.
Let h ∈ H. A subset of doctors D′ ⊆ D is feasible for hospital h if |D′| ≤ qh.
Let F(D, qh) = {D′ ⊆ D : |D′| ≤ qh} denote the collection of feasible subsets
of doctors for hospital h. The element ∅ ∈ F(D, qh) denotes “being unmatched”.
Each hospital h has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation Ph over
F(D, qh). Also, for each hospital, each feasible subset of doctors is “acceptable”,
i.e., for each D′ ∈ F(D, qh)\{∅}, D′Ph ∅. For D′, D′′ ∈ F(D, qh) we write D′PhD′′
if hospital h prefers D′ to D′′ (D′ 6= D′′), and D′RhD′′ if hospital h finds D′ at least
as good as D′′, i.e., D′PhD′′ or D′ = D′′. Let PH = (Ph)h∈H be the preference
profile for the hospitals.
Let Ph be the restriction of preference relation Ph to {{d}|d ∈ D} ∪ {∅}, i.e.,
individual doctors in D and being unmatched. For each d, d′ ∈ D ∪ {∅}, we write
dPh d
′ if dPh d′ and dRh d′ if dRh d′.3 Since each doctor is acceptable, for each
d ∈ D, we have dPh ∅. Let PH = (Ph)h∈H .
2In the literature, each doctor d has a preference relation over the hospitals and the prospect of
“being unmatched” (or some outside option), which is denoted by d and if h ∈ H such that hPd d,
then h is an acceptable hospital for doctor d. If the hospital is not acceptable, then the doctor
may reject the assignment and wait to apply to the mechanism again in the future. In the extreme
case, the doctor does not get the medical license to practice medicine. Since the consequences
might be dire, we assume that a doctor finds each hospital acceptable.
3With some abuse of notation, we often write x for a singleton {x}.
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We assume that for each hospital h ∈ H, Ph is responsive4, or more precisely,
a responsive extension of Ph, such that (r1) as long as a hospital’s quota is not
reached, it prefers to fill a position with a doctor rather than leaving it unfilled and
(r2) a hospital if faced with two sets of potential doctors that differ only in one
doctor, it prefers the set of doctors containing the more preferred doctor, i.e., for
each D′ ∈ F(D, qh),
(r1) if d ∈ D\D′ and |D′| < qh, then (D′ ∪ d)PhD′ and
(r2) if d ∈ D\D′ and d′ ∈ D′, then ((D′\d′) ∪ d) PhD′ if and only if dPh d′.
Each hospital h ∈ H, has a complete and transitive priority relation h
over D (not necessarily strict). The priority relation of each hospital is given by
the law, hence the priority surpasses preference. Hence, the preferences are used to
break ties in priorities. If d h d′, then d has a higher priority than d′ at h. Let
H = (h)h∈H be the priority profile.
A problem is given by (PD,PH ,H , q). Let P be a set of problems. Let
(PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P be a problem. A matching is a function µ on the set D ∪H
such that (1) each doctor is either matched to exactly one hospital or exempt, i.e.,
for each d ∈ D, either µ(d) ∈ H or µ(d) = ∅; (2) each hospital is matched to a
feasible set of doctors, i.e., for each h ∈ H, µ(h) ∈ F(D, qh); and (3) a doctor is
matched to a hospital if and only if the hospital is matched to the doctor, i.e., for
each d ∈ D and h ∈ H, µ(d) = h if and only if d ∈ µ(h). Let µ be a matching and
i, j ∈ I. If j ∈ µ(i), then we say that i and j are matched to one another and that
they are mates in µ. The set µ(i) is agent i’s match. LetM (PD,PH ,H , q) be the
4Roth (1985) and Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for a discussion about this assumption.
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set of matchings for the market (PD,PH ,H , q).
A matching respects priority if there is no doctor–hospital pair such that
they are not mates in a matching but the doctor would prefer to be matched to
the hospital and the hospital has unfilled positions or another doctor who has
a lower priority than the doctor at the the hospital is matched to the hospital.
Formally, a matching µ respects priority if there are no d ∈ D and h ∈ H
such that [h Pd ϕd (PD,PH ,H , q)] and [|ϕh (PD,PH ,H , q) | < qh or there is d′ ∈
ϕh (PD,PH ,H , q) such that d h d′]. LetR (PD,PH ,H , q) be the set of matchings
that respect priority for the market (PD,PH ,H , q).
A matching is doctor–efficient if there is no other matching such that each
doctor finds it at least as desirable and at least one doctor prefers. A matching
is efficient if there is no other matching such that each agent finds it at least as
desirable and at least one agent prefers. A matching is priority constrained–efficient
if there is no other matching that respects priority such that each agent finds it at
least as desirable and at least one agent prefers. Formally, a matching µ is doctor–
efficient if there is no matching µ′ such that for each d ∈ D, µ′(d) Rd µ(d) and
there is d ∈ D, µ′(d) Pd µ(d). A matching µ is efficient if there is no matching µ′
such that for each i ∈ D, µ′(i) Ri µ(i) and there is i ∈ I, µ′(i) Pi µ(i). A matching µ
is priority constrained–efficient if there is no matching µ′ ∈ R (PD,PH ,H , q)
that respects priority such that for each i ∈ D, µ′(i) Ri µ(i) and there is i ∈ I,
µ′(i) Pi µ(i). Let DE (PD,PH ,H , q), E (PD,PH ,H , q), and PCE (PD,PH ,H , q)
be the set of doctor–efficient, efficient, and priority constrained–efficient matchings
for the market (PD,PH ,H , q), respectively.
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Many real-life centralized matching markets employ mechanisms that only ask
for the preferences over individual partners. Since the social service is compulsory,
the doctors cannot report whether they would like to be exempt. Hence, for each
doctor d ∈ D, the mechanism only focuses on the restriction of preference relation
Pd on H. We also assume that quotas are commonly known by the hospitals.
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Throughout the paper, we focus on this class of mechanisms. A mechanism ϕ
assigns a matching to each problem. We often denote agent i’s match ϕ(P )(i) by
ϕi(P ).
Next, we describe desirable properties of mechanisms. The first set of prop-
erties is related to Pareto-efficiency. A mechanism is doctor–efficient if for each
problem, the mechanism assigns a matching such that there is no other matching
such that each doctor finds it at least as desirable and at least one doctor prefers. A
mechanism is efficient if for each problem, the mechanism assigns a matching such
that there is no other matching such that each agent finds it at least as desirable
and at least one agent prefers. A mechanism is priority constrained–efficient if for
each problem, the mechanism assigns a matching such that there is no other match-
ing that respects priority such that each agent finds it at least as desirable and at
least one agent prefers. Formally, a mechanism ϕ is doctor–efficient if for each
problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, we have ϕ (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ DE (PD,PH ,H , q).
A mechanism ϕ is efficient if for each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, we have
ϕ (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ E (PD,PH ,H , q). A mechanism ϕ is priority constrained–
efficient if for each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, we have ϕ (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈
5Contrary to Sönmez (1997), we assume that quotas cannot be manipulated.
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PCE (PD,PH ,H , q).
The second property is respecting priority, i.e., for each problem, the mecha-
nism assigns a matching that respects priority. Formally, a mechanism ϕ respects
priority if for each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, we have ϕ (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈
R (PD,PH ,H , q).
The third property is strategy–proofness, i.e., no doctor should benefit from
misrepresenting his preferences. Formally, a mechanism ϕ is strategy–proof if for
each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, each d ∈ D, and each P ′d, we have ϕ(Pd, P−d,PH ,H
, q)(d) Rd ϕ(P
′
d, P−d,PH ,H , q)(d).
The last property is minimizing unfilled positions, i.e., for each problem, the
mechanism assigns a matching such that there is no doctor–hospital pair such that
the hospital has unfilled positions but the doctor is not matched to any hospi-
tal. Formally, a mechanism ϕ minimizes unfilled positions if for each problem
(PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, there are no d ∈ D and h ∈ H such that |ϕh(PD,PH ,H , q)| <
qh and ϕd(PD,PH ,H , q) /∈ H.
Next, we define different mechanisms that are employed in many real-life prob-
lems. We start with the mechanisms that have been used in Colombia by the Min-
istry of Health. To better understand these mechanisms, we make two changes:
First, we describe the mechanisms in terms of hospitals rather than in terms of
states of Colombia (departamentos). This allows to compare effectively these mech-
anisms to other well-known mechanisms in the literature. Second, we incorporate
the priorities into the mechanism. This allows us to show that incorporating the
priorities to the current mechanism is not sufficient to satisfy respecting priorities.
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The first one is the mechanism that the ministry was using during 2012.
Algorithm 1. [Ministry of Health - 2012, M2012]
Step 1: Each doctor enrolls in a hospital.
Step 2: At each hospital, a lottery is used to assign doctors to the hospital. The
doctors that are not assigned to any hospital are exempt from the compulsory
social service.
For each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, let M2012(PD,PH ,H , q) be the matching
resulting from Algorithm 1.
The above mechanism was modified in January 2013 by the Ministry of Health.
Algorithm 2. [Ministry of Health - 2013, M2013]
Step 1: Each doctor enrolls in an hospital. However, in each hospital, the number of
enrolled doctors cannot be more than the double of the total available positions
in that hospital.
Step 2: At each hospital, a lottery is used to assign doctors without priority to the
hospital. The doctors that are not assigned to any hospital are exempt from
the compulsory social service.
For each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, let M2013(PD,PH ,H , q) be the matching
resulting from Algorithm 2.
Next mechanism is the Deferred Acceptance with priority (DA) which is
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based on Gale and Shapley (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm.6
Algorithm 3. [Deferred Acceptance with priority, DA]
Step 1: Each doctor proposes to his preferred hospital. Each hospital tentatively as-
signs the positions to its proposers one at a time following the priority relation.
If two doctors are indifferent in terms of priority relation, then the strict prefer-
ence relation of the hospital is used for the tentative assignment. All remaining
proposers, if any, are rejected.
...
Step k: Each doctor that is rejected in Step k− 1 proposes to the next hospital in his
preference relation. Each hospital considers the doctors that were tentatively
assigned a position in Step k−1 together with its new proposers. The hospital
tentatively assigns the positions to these doctors one at a time following the
priority relation. If two doctors are indifferent in terms of priority relation,
then the strict preference relation of the hospital is used for the tentative
assignment. All remaining proposers are rejected. A doctor that is rejected
by all hospitals is exempt from the compulsory social service.
The algorithm terminates when each doctor is assigned to a hospital or exempt
from the compulsory social service. For each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, let
DA(PD,PH ,H , q) be the matching resulting from Algorithm 3.
The next mechanism is Immediate Acceptance (IA) which also known as the
6We refer to Roth (2008) for an account on the history and applications of the deferred accep-
tance algorithm.
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Boston Mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
Algorithm 4. [Immediate Acceptance, IA]
Step 1: Each doctor proposes to his preferred hospital. Each hospital assigns the
positions to its proposers one at a time following the priority relation. If two
doctors have the same priority relation, then the strict preference relation of
the hospital is used for the tentative assignment. All remaining proposers, if
any, are rejected.
...
Step k: Each doctor that is rejected in Step k − 1 proposes to the next hospital in
his preference relation. Each hospital assigns its remaining unfilled positions
to its proposers one at a time following the priority relation. If two doctors
are indifferent in terms of priority relation, then the strict preference relation
of the hospital is used for the assignment. All remaining proposers, if any,
are rejected. A doctor that is rejected by all hospitals is exempt from the
compulsory social service.
The algorithm terminates when each doctor is assigned to a hospital or exempt
from the compulsory social service. For each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, let
IA(PD,PH ,H , q) be the matching resulting from Algorithm 4.
Finally, we introduce the Top Trading Cycle mechanism which is introduced by
Shapley and Scarf (1974). Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) adapt this mechanism
for the problems with priorities. We extend this mechanism to the problems with
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preferences and priorities.
Algorithm 5. [Top Trading Cycle, TTC]
Step 1: Assign a counter for each hospital which keeps track of how many unfilled
positions there are. Initially, set the counter of a hospital equal to its quota.
Each doctor points to his preferred hospital. Each hospital points to the
doctor who has the highest priority (If two doctors are indifferent in terms of
priority relation, then the strict preference relation of the hospital is used for
the assignment.) Since the number of doctors and hospitals are finite, there is
at least one cycle. (A cycle is an ordered list of distinct hospitals and distinct
doctors (d1, h1, d2, ..., dk, hk) where d1 points to h1, h1 points to d2,...,dk points
to hk, and hk points to d1.) Moreover, each hospital can be part of at most
one cycle. Every doctor in a cycle is assigned a position at the hospital he
points to and is removed. The counter of each hospital in a cycle is reduced
by one, and if it is reduced to zero, the hospital is removed. Counters of other
hospitals stay put.
...
Step k: Each remaining doctor points to the preferred hospital among the remaining
ones, and each remaining hospital points to the doctor with the highest priority
among the remaining ones.(If two doctors are indifferent in terms of priority
relation, then the strict preference relation of the hospital is used for the
assignment.) There is a cycle. Every doctor in a cycle is assigned a position
at the hospital he points to and is removed. The counter of each hospital in a
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cycle is reduced by one, and if it is reduced to zero, the hospital is removed.
Counters of other hospitals stay put. A doctor that is never a part of a cycle
is exempt from the compulsory social service.
The algorithm terminates when each doctor is assigned to a hospital or exempt
from the compulsory social service. For each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, let
TTC(PD,PH ,H , q) be the matching resulting from Algorithm 5.
1.3 Results
First, we present our results about the set of matchings. Figure 1.3 summarizes
the relationship between set of matchings.
Theorem 1.1. The set of doctor–efficient matchings is a subset of the set of effi-
cient matchings, i.e., for each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, PCE (PD,PH ,H , q) ⊆
E (PD,PH ,H , q). However, the converse is not true.
Proof. First, we show that any doctor–efficient matching is efficient. Let (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈
P be a problem and µ ∈ DE (PD,PH ,H , q) be a doctor–efficient matching. Assume
on the contrary that µ is not efficient. Then, there is µ′ ∈ M (PD,PH ,H , q) such
that for each i ∈ I, µ′(i) Ri µ(i) and there is i ∈ I, µ′(i) Pi µ(i). In particular, for
each d ∈ D, µ′(d) Rd µ(d). However, there is h ∈ H such that µ′(h) 6= µ(h). Then,
there is d ∈ D such that µ′(d) 6= µ(d). Since the preference relation is strict, then
µ′(d) Pd µ(d) which is contradiction to the fact that µ is a doctor–efficient match-
ing. Hence, µ ∈ E (PD,PH ,H , q). However, the converse is not true. To see this,
consider a problem (PD,PH ,H , q) with 2 doctors, 2 hospitals, and preferences over
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individual partners and priorities given by the columns in Table 1.1. Each hospital
h has quota qh = 1.
Doctors Hospitals
Pd1 Pd2 h1 h2 Ph1 Ph2
h1 h2 d1 d2 d2 d1
h2 h1 d2 d1 d1 d2
Table 1.1: Preferences P and priorities  in Theorem 1.1.
Note that µ =
h1 h2
d2 d1
 is efficient but not doctor-efficient.
Theorem 1.2. The set of efficient matchings is a subset of the set of prior-
ity constrained–efficient matchings, i.e., for each problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P,
E (PD,PH ,H , q) ⊆ PCE (PD,PH ,H , q). However, the converse is not true.
Proof. First, we show that any efficient matching is priority constrained–efficient.
Let (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P be a problem and µ ∈ E (PD,PH ,H , q) be a efficient
matching. Assume on the contrary that µ is not priority constrained–efficient. Then,
there is µ′ ∈ R (PD,PH ,H , q) such that for each i ∈ I, µ′(i) Ri µ(i) and there is
i ∈ I, µ′(i) Pi µ(i). Since µ′ ∈ R (PD,PH ,H , q) ⊆ M (PD,PH ,H , q) such that
for each i ∈ I, µ′(i) Ri µ(i) and there is i ∈ I, µ′(i) Pi µ(i), it is a contradiction to
the fact that µ is a efficient matching. Hence, µ ∈ PCE (PD,PH ,H , q).
However, the converse is not true. To see this, consider a problem (PD,PH ,H , q)
with 3 doctors, 3 hospitals, and preferences over individual partners and priorities
given by the columns in Table 1.2. Each hospital h has quota qh = 1.
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Doctors Hospitals
Pd1 Pd2 Pd3 h1 h2 h3 Ph1 Ph2 Ph3
h2 h1 h1 d1 d2 d2 d2 d1 d3
h1 h2 h2 d3 d1 d1 d3 d2 .
h3 h3 h3 d2 d3 d3 d1 d3 .
Table 1.2: Preferences P and priorities  in Theorem 1.2.





 , µ2 =
h1 h2 h3
d3 d1 d2







 , µ5 =
h1 h2 h3
d1 d3 d2




Note that µ6 ∈ PCE (PD,PH ,H , q) but µ6 /∈ E (PD,PH ,H , q).
Theorem 1.3. The intersection of the set of doctor–efficient matchings and the set
of matchings that respect priority might be empty, i.e., there is a problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈
P, DE (PD,PH ,H , q) ∩ R (PD,PH ,H , q) = ∅. The intersection of the set of effi-
cient matchings and the set of matchings that respect priority might be empty, i.e.,
there is a problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, E (PD,PH ,H , q) ∩R (PD,PH ,H , q) = ∅
Proof. To show that the intersection of the set of doctor–efficient matchings and
the set of matchings that respect priority might be empty, consider the problem in
Theorem 1.2. It is easy to verify that µ1, µ2, µ3, and µ4 are doctor–efficient but do
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not respect priority. Similarly, to show that the intersection of the set of efficient
matchings and the set of matchings that respect priority might be empty, consider
the problem in Theorem 1.2. It is easy to verify that µ1, µ2, µ3, and µ4 are efficient
but do not respect priority.
Theorem 1.4. The intersection of the set of priority constrained-efficient match-
ings and the set of matchings that respect priority is not empty, i.e., for each prob-
lem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P, PCE (PD,PH ,H , q) ∩ R (PD,PH ,H , q) 6= ∅. More-
over, the matching resulting from the deferred acceptance algorithm with priority
is always in the intersection, i.e., DA

(PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ PCE (PD,PH ,H , q) ∩
R (PD,PH ,H , q). Also, the set of matchings that respect priority is not always a
subset of the set of priority constrained-efficiently–efficient matchings, i.e., there is
a problem (PD,PH ,H , q) ∈ P such that R (PD,PH ,H , q) 6⊆ PCE (PD,PH ,H , q).
Proof. First, we show that the matching resulting from the deferred acceptance
algorithm with priority respects priority. Suppose it is not the case. Then, there








|DAh (PD,PH ,H , q) | < qh or there is d′ ∈ DAh (PD,PH ,H , q) such that
d h d′]. There are two cases:
• |DAh (PD,PH ,H , q) | < qh. Since h Pd DAd (PD,PH ,H , q), d has been
tentatively assigned to h before being assigned to DAh (PD,PH ,H , q). Since
|DAh (PD,PH ,H , q) | < qh, d should never been rejected by h at any step of
the algorithm.
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• There is d′ ∈ DAh (PD,PH ,H , q) such that d h d′. Since h Pd DAd (PD,PH ,H , q),
d has been tentatively assigned to h before being assigned toDAh (PD,PH ,H , q).
Since there is d′ ∈ DAh (PD,PH ,H , q) such that d h d′, d should never been
rejected by h at any step of the algorithm before d′.
Next, we show that the matching resulting from the deferred acceptance al-
gorithm with priority is priority constrained–efficient. Assume on the contrary
that µ = DAh (PD,PH ,H , q) is not priority constrained–efficient. Then, there
is µ′ ∈ R (PD,PH ,H , q) such that for each i ∈ I, µ′(i) Ri µ(i) and there is i ∈ I,
µ′(i) Pi µ(i).
In particular, for each d ∈ D, µ′(d) Rd µ(d). However, there is h ∈ H such
that µ′(h) 6= µ(h). Then, there is d ∈ D such that µ′(d) 6= µ(d). This contradicts
to the fact that the matching resulting from the deferred acceptance algorithm with
priority weakly Pareto–dominates any matching that respects priority since the set
of matchings that respect priority is a lattice (Roth, 2008). Hence, it is priority
constrained–efficient.
In the problem in Theorem 1.2, the matching µ6 = DAd (PD,PH ,H , q) which
is the matching resulting from the deferred acceptance algorithm with priority is
priority constrained–efficient and respects priority.
To see that the set of matchings that respect priority is not always a subset of
the set of priority constrained-efficient matchings, consider a problem (PD,PH ,H , q)
with 3 doctors, 3 hospitals, and preferences over individual partners and priorities
given by the columns in Table 1.3. Each hospital h has quota qh = 1.
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Doctors Hospitals
Pd1 Pd2 Pd3 h1 h2 h3 Ph1 Ph2 Ph3
h1 h2 h3 d2 d3 d1 d1 d2 d3
h2 h3 h1 d3 d1 d2 d3 d1 d2
h3 h1 h2 d1 d2 d3 d2 d3 d1
Table 1.3: Preferences P and priorities  in Theorem 1.4.





 , µ2 =
h1 h2 h3
d1 d2 d3







 , µ5 =
h1 h2 h3
d2 d1 d3




It is to verify that µ1 and µ6 respect priority but they are not priority constrained–
efficient since each agent is better–off at µ2 which respects priority.
Next, we present our results regarding the properties of the mechanisms.
Theorem 1.5. The mechanisms M2012 and M2013 are not priority constrained–
efficient, strategy–proof, and neither respect priority nor minimize unfilled posi-
tions.
Proof. Consider a problem (PD,PH ,H , q) with 2 doctors, 2 hospitals, and pref-
erences over individual partners and priorities given by the columns in Table 1.4.
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Each hospital h has quota qh = 1.
Doctors Hospitals
Pd1 Pd2 h Ph1 Ph2
h1 h1 d1 d1 d1
h2 h2 d2 d2 d2
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 1.4: Preferences P and priorities  in Theorem 1.5.





which is the boxed matching in Table 1.4.
The mechanisms M2012 and M2013 are not priority constrained–efficient since
there is a matching µ′ =
h1 h2
d1 d2
 which respects priority such that each agent
finds it at least as desirable and at least one agent prefers. Hence, the mechanisms
M2012 and M2013 are not neither doctor–efficient nor efficient.
The mechanisms M2012 and M2013 do not respect priorities since d2 ∈ D prefers
to be matched to h2 to not to be assigned and h2 has unfilled position.
The mechanisms M2012 and M2013 do not minimize unfilled positions, since h2
is not assigned to any doctor, i.e., |ϕh2(PD,H ,PH , q)| = 0 < qh = 1 and d2 is not
assigned to any hospital.
The mechanisms M2012 and M2013 are not strategy–proof. Suppose that d2
reports P ′d2 = h2, h1. In this case, suppose that the matching recommended by
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M2012 and M2013 is µ′ =
h1 h2
d1 d2
. Note that µ′(d2) Pd2 µ(d2). Hence, P ′d2 is a
profitable manipulation for d2 in violation of strategy–proofness.
Theorem 1.6. The mechanisms IA and TTC do not respect priorities.
Proof. To see this, consider the problem in Theorem 1.2. It is easy to verify that the
matching µ2 = IA(PD,PH ,H , q) does not respect priority. Similarly, the matching
µ1 = TTC(PD,PH ,H , q) does not respect priority.
Theorem 1.7. The mechanisms IA and TTC are doctor–efficient. Hence, they are
efficient and priority constrained–efficient.
Proof. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) showed that the mechanisms IA and
TTC are doctor–efficient.
Theorem 1.8. The mechanism DA is strategy–proof.
Proof. Suppose that it is not the case. Then, there are (PD,PH ,H , q), d ∈ D and




d, P−d,PH ,H , q) Pd DAd (Pd, P−d,PH ,H , q). There are two
cases:
• DAd (P ′d, P−d,PH ,H , q) = h ∈ H. Note that at (Pd, P−d,PH ,H , q), d has
been tentatively assigned to h and has been rejected. Since PH is as before, h
would reject d as well in this case.
• DAd (P ′d, P−d,PH ,H , q) = ∅. Note that |D| >
∑
qi and at (Pd, P−d,PH ,H
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, q) d has been rejected by each hospital. Since (P−d, PH) is as before, d would
be rejected by each hospital as well. Therefore, DAd (Pd, P−d,PH ,H , q) = ∅.
Theorem 1.9. The mechanism TTC is strategy–proof.
Proof. Suppose that it is not the case. Then, there are (PD,PH ,H , q), d ∈ D and
P ′d such that TTCd(P
′
d, P−d,PH ,H , q) Pd TTCd(Pd, P−d,PH ,H , q). There are two
cases:
• TTCd(P ′d, P−d,PH ,H , q) = h ∈ H. Note that at (Pd, P−d,PH ,H , q), d
points to h and d is not a part of a cycle. Since (P−d, PH) is as before, h never
closes a cycle that d participates.
• TTCd(P ′d, P−d,PH ,H , q) = ∅. Note that |D| >
∑
qi and at (Pd, P−d,PH ,H
, q), d is not a part of any cycle. Since (P−d, PH) is as before, the rest of
the agents point as they were pointing and d cannot be a part of any cycle.
Therefore, TTCd(Pd, P−d,PH ,H , q) = ∅.
Theorem 1.10. The mechanism IA is not strategy–proof.
Proof. To see this, consider the problem in Theorem 1.2. The matching µ2 =
IA(PD,PH ,H , q) is the matching resulting from the immediate acceptance algo-
rithm. Suppose that d2 reports P
′
d2
= h2, h1, h3. In this case, the matching resulting
from the immediate acceptance algorithm is µ3 = IA(P ′d2 , PD\{d2},PH ,H , q) Note
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is a profitable manipulation for d2 in violation
of strategy–proofness.
Theorem 1.11. The mechanisms DA, IA, and TCC minimize unfilled positions.
Proof. Suppose it is not the case. Then, there are (PD,PH ,H , q), h ∈ H such that
|ϕh(PD,PH ,h, q)| < qh, and d ∈ D such that ϕd(PD,PH ,H , q) = ∅.
• DA: Since ϕd(PD,PH ,H , q) = ∅, d is rejected by any hospital. However, h
would not reject d if there is unfilled position.
• IA: Since ϕd(PD,PH ,H , q) = ∅, d is rejected by any hospital. However, h
would not reject d if there is unfilled position.
• TTC: Since ϕd(PD,PH ,H , q) = ∅, d points to each hospital and never be a
part of cycle. However, in the last step of the algorithm, h would point d and
d would point to h forming a cycle.
Table 1.5 summarizes our results.
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Property M2012 M2013 DA IA TTC
Doctor–Efficiency − − − + +
Efficiency − − − + +
Priority constrained–efficiency − − + + +
Respecting priority − − + − −
Strategy–proofness − − + − +
Minimizing unfilled positions − − + + +
Table 1.5: Summary of the results. The mechanism corresponding to a column satisfies


































Figure 1.2: The difference between the number of enrolled doctors and the positions in
















Figure 1.4: The relationships of the set of matchings for the problem in Theorem 1.2.
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Figure 1.5: The relationships of the set of matchings in Theorem 1.4.
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Chapter 2: Overcoming the Rural Hospital Theorem:
Compulsory Social Service Allocation in Colombia
2.1 Introduction
The quality of health care systems depends highly on the availability of health
professionals. However, rural communities tend to suffer from a lower availability
of these professionals. The small population and scale makes the loss of a single
health professional likely to have far-reaching consequences (Burrows et al., 2012).
Rural areas lack health professionals primarily because health professionals try to
avoid them. The allocation of medical residents in the US achieved through the
National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) has shown the following pattern:
“A number of hospitals, particularly Rural Hospitals, fail each year to fill as many
positions as they have available, and find that a high percentage of the positions they
do fill are filled by foreign medical school graduates” (Roth, 1986). In the health
professionals market, a stable allocation is one in which there does not exist a pair
of hospital and health professionals not mutually assigned and that they prefer each
other. The so called “Rural Hospital Theorem” states that for any stable allocation
the unfilled positions will be the same. Hence the solution to the vacancy of rural
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hospital positions cannot be found within this type of allocations. Therefore Roth
(1986) concludes that “this maldistribution seems unlikely to be changed by any
system that does not involve some element of compulsion, or some change in the
relative numbers of available positions”.
In Colombia, the Ministry of Health has tackled this problem through a pro-
gram called Compulsory Social Service1, hereafter CSS. The health professions that
participate are Medical Lab Science, Nursing, Medicine, and Dentistry. The CSS
requires health professionals to work at a hospital they assign them to for one year,
70% of which are located in rural areas, but some are located in marginalized ur-
ban ones. The compulsion element comes in through the fact that professionals in
these fields are required to be professionally certified by the Ministry of Health; this
happens only after participating in the CSS.
There are other entry level clearinghouses that have been studied in the lit-
erature. Examples of such are the National Residency Matching Program which
allocates medical school students in the US to residency training and the allocation
of teachers done by the Ministry of Education in Turkey. However, the compulsory
characteristics makes the CSS different than any other clearinghouse studied in the
literature. The previous chapter details the theoretical motivations underpinning
the question on how to adapt the previously used mechanisms in the literature to
this setting. In this chapter, I evaluate the implemented mechanism.
Since October 2014, the CSS allocation of health professionals has been de-
termined using a single-offer centralized mechanism based on Gale and Shapley’s
1The name in Spanish is Servicio Social Obligatorio.
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(1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). Health professionals report their five
preferred positions and also rank all of the states where they might be assigned.
Based on that information, the ministry creates a ranking of all hospitals for each
participant, and that ranking is used in the assignment process. Additionally, the
Ministry of Health assigns a (coarse) priority order to each hospital. 2 The allo-
cation is determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm, henceforth DA, with
the rankings and priorities3 as inputs.
To study and evaluate the performance of three dimensions of the program,
this chapter uses empirical estimates of the preferences. The first dimension I eval-
uate is the compulsory element, or the fact that participation is compulsory rather
than based on individual rationality. Second, I estimate the allocative efficiency of
the health professionals in the centralized mechanism. Third, I measure the conse-
quences of moving from a single random lottery to a merit-based tie-break.
Colombia’s CSS mechanism has one of the strongest compulsory elements of
any centralized mechanism that has been studied in the literature. I show that com-
pared to the previous decentralized mechanism, the centralized mechanism when
adopted results in significant welfare gains. The first counterfactual answers the
empirical question of whether, given the welfare gains, the program still needs the
compulsory characteristic to successfully allocate health professionals. To this end I
refer to the fact that in October 2012, the allocation was determined by a decentral-
ized system of lotteries that was regularly manipulated by physicians to avoid being
2In this program hospitals do not report preferences of health professionals. Hence, the hospitals
are not strategic agents in this setting, making this allocation problem one-sided. In the literature
this is known as school choice (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
3A single random tie-break is used to break ties in priorities.
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assigned. I simulate the outcome of the centralized mechanism in the absence of the
requirement that students accept the assignment determined by the mechanism. I
find that if physicians were given the opportunity of not ranking all hospitals, about
30% of the them would be left unassigned, implying that for the policy to succeed,
assignments must be mandatory. This contrasts with the 5% rejection rate observed
in the actual allocations.
The second counterfactuals are designed to test the allocative efficiency of
the implemented mechanism. Improving the allocative efficiency, besides improving
the welfare of health professionals, would also reduce the rejection rate. Since this
mechanism uses the DA algorithm to determine the allocations, it is known to respect
priorities and to be strategy proof. The first of these characteristic establishes that
whenever there is position that a health professional prefers relative to the one
she is assigned, that position must be assigned to someone with at least the same
priority. The latter property establishes that no health professional benefits from
misrepresenting his preferences. These properties, although desirable, constrain the
possible allocations and (possibly) entail efficiency costs. In these counterfactuals I
measure the cost in efficiency of these properties. In order to measure the cost of the
respecting priorities property, I compare the allocative efficiency of the allocations
determined by the implemented mechanism with the Top Trading Cycles. This is
due to the fact that the former is known to always yield doctor-efficient allocations
while also being strategy proof. I find small welfare gains implying that respecting
priorities does not come at a major cost. This is due to the fact that the preferences
are significantly heterogeneous.
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To measure the cost of the strategy proof property, I evaluate the allocative
efficiency of mechanisms that, although not strategy proof, are known to be diffi-
cult to manipulate. When determining the allocation, the implemented mechanism
treats equally a reported (one of the most preferred ones) and an implied preference
through the ranking of states (potentially one of the least desired). I show that
breaking ties in priorities in favor of reported hospitals could induce welfare gains
of 8% − 12%. This welfare increase results in a reduction of the rejection rates to
levels of 2%− 5%.
Another proposed mechanism is one which the allocation is determined in
two rounds, using the reported preferences in the first and the implied preferences,
i.e. those implied from state reports, on the second. This results in welfare gains
of up to 13% while also having no rejections in some cases. This mechanism is
neither strategy proof nor respects priorities. However it respects the priorities of
the reported preferred hospitals and is strategy proof in the relative ranking of the
reported preferences.
In the aforementioned mechanism treating differently the reported preferences
than the not reported ones resulted in significant welfare gains. I study next what
the optimal number of hospitals to report is, under the scenario where health pro-
fessionals report truthfully. I find that in some cases the number is significantly low
while on others it is a high number. Most of the environments where DA is used a
truncation of possible reports is also at hand. I propose changing the termination
rule of the deferred acceptance algorithm in order to reduce the cost of congestion
while also allocating all slots.
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Overall, I show that the cost of strategy proofness has first order consequences
on the aggregate welfare of the allocation. Therefore, in this setting fine-tuning the
algorithm has significant welfare consequences. This contrasts with other central-
ized mechanisms settings in which it has been observed that the fine-tuning of the
algorithm is of second order (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017).
The last counterfactual studies the consequences of moving to a merit-based
tie-break. When designing the current program, the ministry decided not to use
the results of the end of study nation-wide exam (known as SaberPro). They did
this because the goal of the mechanism is to tackle the inequality of the allocation
of health professionals; if they used the results, then the better health professionals
would be allocated to the most desired positions. Conversely, not using the results
would improve the odds that very good professionals would be allocated to remote
positions. The allocation of physicians was not congested—that is, there were more
positions than participants. In this case, the quality of allocated professionals would
be a zero sum game in which the more desired positions would have a higher chance
of going to good physicians. This would generate professions that are strongly
congested, by means of giving the professionals with lower scores a higher probability
of not being assigned, an increase in the mean quality of the set of allocated health
professionals. Nevertheless, because of regional priorities, a small fraction of the
hospitals are made worse off.
If statements about welfare are to be accurate, preference estimates must be
accurate, too. Since the allocation mechanism is based on DA, the stated preferences
are treated as the true preferences. This is due to the fact that DA is known to be
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strategy-proof. Had the health professionals not been restricted in the number of
hospitals they report directly it is dominant for them to report their true preferences
(as shown in Chapter 1). This is true even if their objective was not to be assigned
at all. Since professionals report five (5) hospitals, they might misreport their true
preferences in order to improve their chances of getting into a reported position. I do
not observe evidence of this strategic behavior being systematic. Since their ranking
will include all positions, there are many positions at which health professionals can
be allocated regardless of their report. In particular, were one to be strategic with
the report, the last position reported is the one that results in the highest incentive
to do so. This would result in having a higher probability of being assigned to the
last position reported than to the second to last.
Overall, this chapter evaluates a program designed to solve the rural hospital
theorem problem of the health professionals market. This theorem happens to be
framed in the context of rural hospitals but is applicable to all markets where sta-
bility is expected in the outcome. Therefore the lessons learned from the evaluation
of the program at hand are valuable for other markets in which vacant positions are
seen as market failures.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter makes five significant contributions to the literature. First, it
contributes to the public policy literature that examines the inequality of the allo-
cation of health professionals to rural and urban positions. Several current policies
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tackle this problem. For example, in the US, foreign health professionals are waived
the two year residency requirement if they work in a Health Professional Shortage
Area (Burrows et al., 2012). In the case of Japan, Kamada and Kojima (2015)
propose a centralized mechanism that uses hard regional caps to allocate a higher
share of medical interns to that country’s rural regions. Agarwal (2017) discusses
how monetary incentives would modify the allocation of residents in the US. The
approach taken by the Ministry of Health is different in that it uses a centralized
mechanism and makes participation in the allocation compulsory.
Second, it contributes to the empirical study of preferences and allocations
in the case of health professionals. To the best of my knowledge Agarwal (2015)
is the only scholar who has carried out this type of analysis, which he applies to
family medicine residents in the US. Agarwal’s estimates are obtained from the
analysis of observed matches. This chapter, in contrast, uses reported preferences.
The estimates of the preferences show that the health professionals’ preferences are
significantly heterogeneous.
Third, it contributes to the empirical literature on centralized mechanisms,
particularly those that use DA to determine the allocation. In the context of school
choice, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017) estimate parents’ preferences for high schools
in New York and compares the allocation efficiency of centralized and decentralized
mechanisms. In the context of College Admissions, Luflade (2017) studies the value
of information in the performance of the sequential use of truncated DA to allocate
college positions in Tunesia. For the case of health professionals in Colombia, this
chapter shows how, on top of using a centralized mechanism, a compulsory feature
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is central to successfully allocating health professionals to rural areas.
Fourth, it contributes to several influential theoretical results in the large liter-
ature of mechanism design. This is done by comparing several algorithms that have
been proposed previously in terms of allocation efficiency. Erdil and Ergin (2008)
propose an algorithm that eliminates the welfare reducing cycles that the coarse
priorities may induce. I find small welfare gains from moving to that algorithm.
There is a family of algorithms that can be described as adding rank priorities to
the priorities determined by the Ministry of Health, which is described in detail
in Chapter 3. In this family we can find the Immediate Acceptance (Kojima and
Ünver, 2014) and the New Haven algorithms (Kapor et al., 2017). Within this fam-
ily, I compare the efficiency of giving a priority to reported hospitals above any
other priority has substantial welfare gains but at a cost of a having a significant
number of the original priorities not being respected. I show that breaking the ties
in favor of the health professionals who report a hospital as preferred is also within
this family. However, this mechanism respects priorities while having welfare gains
that range from 5%− 9%.
These results can be seen as a contribution to the literature that measures the
costs (gauged in terms of the welfare of health professionals) of the properties of
the allocations that results from DA. Roth (2008) and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017)
do this in the case of the high school slots allocation in New York City. In sharp
contrast to their findings, I find that because the preferences are completed (due to
the fact that the rankings are complete), the fine tuning of the algorithm used to
determine the allocation is a first-order concern.
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Finally, it also contributes to the literature on merit/effort-based priorities in
centralized allocations. This is exemplified by the case of the cadet branch-of-choice
in the US Military Academy (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013). I show that under certain
conditions merit based tie-break can entail welfare gains under certain conditions
yet raise inequality concerns under others.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the in-
stitutional details and the October 2014 allocation data. In Section 3, I detail the
estimation and the results of a random coefficients model of the preferences of health
professionals. Section 4 evaluates the performance of the program in the absence
of the compulsory feature. In section 5, I describe the theoretical properties of
centralized mechanisms and evaluate the allocative efficiency (in terms of health
professional welfare) that would have occurred if other allocation mechanisms had
been used. In section 6, I evaluate the consequences of moving from a random tie-
break to a merit-based one. In section 7, I discuss the assumption that reported
preferences are the true preferences and present evidence that support this is the
case. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
The Compulsory Social Service, hereafter CSS, of health professionals in Colom-
bia was created to tackle the problems of inequality in the allocation of these pro-
fessionals to rural areas and marginalized urban areas in Colombia. It started in
1949 for physicians, 1951 for dentists, 1971 for medical lab scientists, and 1971 for
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nurses. CSS lasts one year.
The inequality in the allocation of health professionals is not exclusive to
Colombia and neither is the compulsory social service solution. Currently Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico4, Peru, and El Salvador also
require, at least for physicians, compulsory social service. All of these programs
emphasize that the social service is a contribution to society. The programs differ
primarily in whether the service must be undertaken before graduation (as part of
their studies) or after graduation (as a first professional work experience).
The CSS in Colombia can be seen as mechanism to overcome the Rural Hos-
pital Theorem effects of the country’s health professionals market. In the matching
literature the Rural Hospital Theorem predicts that under any stable allocation the
set of unmatched hospital positions is the same. The name of this theorem reflects
the fact that rural hospitals tend to have the highest rate of unmatched or vacant
positions. When designing the centralized allocation mechanism, for the Ministry
of Health it was a central objective that the mechanism minimized the number of
unfilled positions.
A centralized mechanism was needed because prior to July 2014, the allocation
mechanism was a system of state-level (departamento) lotteries marred by serious
incentive and efficiency flaws. Specifically, the mechanism generally did not minimize
the number of unfilled positions. In the July 2012 allocation, for example, almost
600 physicians were not allocated even though 300 positions were left unfilled. The
4In 1936, Mexico was the first country who implemented a compulsory social service for physi-
cians. Today this program is known as Servicio Social en Medicina
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main purpose of the mechanism, to allocate health professionals to rural areas, was
not being accomplished.
If a health professional is not assigned, she is exempted from the CSS and
can ask to be professionally certified. The incentive flaws occurred because health
professionals, and specially physicians, were gaming the mechanism to avoid being
allocated. Since October 2014, the allocation in Colombia has been decided and
implemented by the Ministry of Health, which uses a centralized mechanism. This
mechanism, whose design was guided and implemented by economists, implemented
a version of Gale and Shapley (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm. Chapter 1
discuss in detail the motivations needed to implement Gale and Shapley’s (1962)
deferred acceptance algorithm as well as the incentive flaws of the previous mecha-
nisms.
Professionals can apply for three types of positions in the CSS. First are posi-
tions in rural areas (at least 70% of the positions). Second are positions in marginal
urban areas (at most 25% of the positions). Third, are research positions (at most
5%). The first two types can only be obtained through the centralized mechanism.
Investigation positions are assigned directly by the entities that conduct the in-
vestigations, and professionals do not participate in the centralized allocation. To
determine the allocation, the Ministry of Health imposes a priority order that needs
to be satisfied by every hospital. Consequently, hospitals in this setting are not
strategic agents. Thus, the allocation is a one-sided problem known in the literature
as school choice (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
Health professionals are given three types of priorities that define the prior-
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ity order under which they are accepted at each hospital. In the first type (which
corresponds to Colombian law), a professional who is indigenous is given priority at
hospitals located in indigenous regions. Similarly, a professional who is “raizal” (a
native of the Archipelago of San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina) is given
priority at hospitals in the Archipelago. In the second type the priorities follow
from Health Ministry regulations. Specifically, priorities are given to professionals
who 1) are mothers with small children, 2) have impairments or disabilities, or 3)
need special medical treatment. The third priority type takes into account hospital’s
regional preferences: hospital prefer professionals who graduated from their state
or who were born in their state. Within this system Colombian law takes prece-
dence over the Ministry’s regulations and the latter take precedence over hospital
preferences. Hence, the priority structure is as follows:
In summary, the priority structure is the following:
• Being indigenous,
• Being a “raizal” (native of Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina),
• Being pregnant,
• Being a mother or a father who has small children,
• Being a professional who has impairments or disabilities,
• Being a professional who needs special treatment,
• Graduating from a University from the same state as the hospital,
• Being born in the same state as the hospital.
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Under this system the priority order would work as follows. Assuming that
health professionals will qualify for no more than one of the Ministry-regulation
priorities, pregnant women will have the top priority at all hospitals that do not
grant priorities given by the Colombian law. In any given state, pregnant women
who were born in and who graduated in that state will be placed first, while those
who graduated in but were not born in that state will be placed next. Finally, those
who were born in that state but did not graduate in it will be placed third in the
priority order.
In all of the clearinghouses previously studied in the literature, having a higher
priority is good news for each participant. In this case it is not necessarily the case
since having a very high priority results in a high chance of getting assigned and if
a health professional wants to avoid being allocated at all she will have no chance
of doing so. Hence, as there are more participants than positions, having a higher
priority has a higher chance of meaning bad news for the health professionals. Also,
notice that to hire a pregnant professional might not be on the best interest of the
hospitals. As such, some of the priorities go counter to the interest of the hospitals,
another difference with what has been studied in the literature.
Health professions who participate in the CSS belong to one of four profes-
sions5 Medical Lab Scientist6, Medicine, Nursing, and Dentistry. To be profession-
ally certified, professionals in these fields need a valid professional ID card that is
authorized by the Ministry of Health. The social service is compulsory because to
5This health professions are all undergraduate studies.
6In Colombia this profession is known as Bacteriology and Clinical Lab and professionals in this
area are usually referred to as simply bacteriologists.
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become certified, health professionals must participate in the CSS.
The Ministry allocates the positions on a quarterly basis. As mentioned earlier,
professionals who are not assigned can ask to be professionally certified immediately.
If a professional rejects her allocation, she is not allowed to participate in the central-
ized allocation during the next two allocations (i.e., she will need to wait 9 months
before participating again) and because she is not certified, she cannot work in her
profession during that period. A 9 month penalty is a high penalty considering that
it is for a 12 month position. However, it has been observed that about 3 − 6% of
the health professionals reject the position they are assigned to.
The mechanism incorporates the compulsory characteristic by not allowing
the professionals to report an outside option in addition to the penalty for not
accepting a position. This is due to the fact that if there is an equal number of
professionals and positions, allowing professionals to report an outside option could
result in positions being left unfilled. As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives
of the mechanism is to minimize the unfilled positions. Hence, the mechanism is
also compulsory in the respect that a professional cannot simply accept an outside
option and pay a penalty for it.
A health professional can choose any position that currently is unassigned or
that will become available before the next allocation. However, because Colombia
has a large number of hospitals, professionals are required to report up to five
preferred hospitals. They also are asked to rank the states in which they would
like to fulfill their CSS obligation. Thus, their ranking of hospitals is constructed
as follows: preferred hospitals are placed at the top; then all hospitals in each
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reported state (excluding those reported as preferred) are randomly allocated in the
professional’s ranking following the state’s stated order.
Ties in the ranking of Professionals (Hospitals) in the Hospital’s (Profes-
sional’s) rankings (priorities) are broken using a single tie-break. Using these rank-
ings and priorities the allocation is determined using the Deferred Acceptance-
Algorithm, described in Chapter 1.
The mechanism rests on the assumption that no professional is willing to
incur the penalty of not being able to work in his or her profession for 9 months.
This a substantial penalty if one takes into account that the assignments are due
for one year. As shown in Chapter 1, the restriction on preferences under this
assumption does not deteriorate the mechanism’s strategy-proofness because the
weakly dominant strategy is for each professional to report their true restricted
preferences (i.e., report their true preferences with the restriction that the outside
option is placed last). This is true even in the limiting case in which no positions are
acceptable for a health professional. This is due to the fact that, as shown below,
since the allocation is determined using DA, she needs to be rejected by all of the
hospitals at some point in the algorithm.
2.2.1 October 2014 Allocation
In October 2014, a total of:
• 194 Medical Lab Scientists participated for 83 positions in 81 hospitals.
• 708 Dentists participated for 109 positions in 97 hospitals.
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• 386 Physicians participated for 1025 positions in 544 hospitals.
• 828 Nurses participated for 194 positions in 148 hospitals.
Note that the ratio of professionals to available positions varies by profession.
In the case of physicians, for example, there are more than 2 positions available
per physician (a case of very low congestion), whereas in the other professions the
opposite is true. Dentists, for instance, face the most congested allocation, with over
7 participants per position. The reason why there are so many positions available for
physicians is the mechanism used before the centralized one was being manipulated
to avoid allocation.
I obtained secure access to administrative data for all health professionals
that participated in the first allocation that used the centralized mechanism. For
each health professional, I have data on the hospital’s reported ranking (up to
five). I have information on the state where the professional was born, the state
where he or she graduated, and her or his gender. Although I have no data on
professionals’ exact city of birth, most of Colombia’s biggest cities (where 75% of
the country’s population resides) are state capitals, and most universities where a
health professional degree can be obtained are located in these cities. Therefore, I use
the capital of the state as a proxy for location. From this I construct key variables,
such as the distance from the hospital to the capital of the state of graduation or
origin.
The webpage interface used by the Ministry of Health forces professionals to
report five positions. However, the interface also allows participants to report the
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Med-Lab Nurses Med-Docs Dentists
Female (%) 80 91 58 76
Reports St. (%) 92 89 94 91
Repeats Reported Pos.(%) 6 8 8 7
Diff. St. of Grad (%) 43 25 34 34
Dummy Priority (%) 6 13 10 9
Total Num. of
Prof. with Priority 12 104 39 64
Num. Priority Raizal 0 0 2 2
Num. Priority Indigenous 2 11 2 6
Num. Priority Pregnant 7 50 25 31
Num. Priority Mother 1 19 6 9
Num. Priority Father 1 2 3 9
Num. Priority Handicap 1 12 4 9
Num. Priority Safety 0 0 0 1
Table 2.1: Professionals Characteristics by Profession
same position more than once. Indeed, about 7% of participants report a preferred
position more than once, presumably in an attempt to game the system. But this
choice does not give participants an extra chance to receive their preference, nor
does it allow them to have a full five choices. Moreover, when reporting the ranking
of states, these by default were ranked in alphabetical order. Around 8% of the
participants decided not to modify the displayed ranking. I observe that the different
professions differ mainly in terms of the share of participants who are female. The
profession with the most females is Nursing (91%), whereas Medicine has the lowest
share (58%).
In the case of non-regional priorities, the one most observed is being pregnant.
I observe that Nursing has the highest share of professionals who have non-regional
priorities (13%), while among Medical Lab scientists this share is only 6%. Hence,
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Med-Lab Nurses Med-Docs Dentists
Rural (%) 71 78 85 86
Assigned (%) 73 75 79 87
Dist. Capital (km) 89 66 70 77
Compensatorio (%) 20 20 12 14
Coca (%) 25 32 19 26
Quota 1.02 1.21 1.88 1.13
Table 2.2: Hospital Characteristics by Profession
the priority structure for all of the professions is quite coarse because most partici-
pants will only have a regional priority. Moreover, participants who were both born
and raised in the same state are given precedence in that state over those who were
not. Because of the manner in which the priority structure was developed, subjects
who have any of the aforementioned priorities will compete among themselves for
all of the positions. Then the subjects who do not have any priority will compete
among themselves for the remaining positions, as seen in Table 2.1.
With regards to hospital characteristics, I observe that about 80% of positions
were occupied at the time of the allocation–that is, they will become available during
the next three months. In all cases, a significant number of the positions are located
in state-capital cities (18%). I also observe that positions on average are located
79km from their capital. Moreover, around 25% are located in counties where coca
was produced in 2013. Additionally, 16% of the positions offered a compensatorio
day, or an additional paid rest day mandated by Colombian law for employees who
work four consecutive weekends, as seen in Table 2.2.
Hospitals need authorization from the Ministry of Health to open a CSS posi-
48
tion. When they do so, hospitals offer for that position a wage that is set in reference
to the Colombian Monthly Minimum Wage. There is no negotiation over wages: the
Colombian Monthly Minimum Wage is set on a yearly basis and wages are automat-
ically updated so that there is no need to reapply for the position (an administrative
process that can take several months). Moreover, when a professional applies to the
CSS he or she observes a list of available positions and the wage offered for each. In
other words, during each quarterly allocation, wages are exogenously determined.
A histogram of the wages is shown in Figure 2.1. In 2014, the Colombian Minimum
Monthly Wage $616, 000 COP, approximately $300 USD. As is evident from the his-
togram, there is a significant dispersion on the wages offered. Most of the hospitals
are public state institutions and as such the wages belong to the state budget.
Because professionals choose both the hospital where they will work and the
county where they will live, the characteristics of the counties in which hospitals are
located play an important role in hospital choice . The Municipal Panel Data CEDE7
provides demographic information about the counties in which the hospitals are
located. I find that both geographic location and the Unsatisfied Basic Necessities
Index, hereafter UBN, which is a measure of poverty in each county, affect hospital
choice.
2.3 Estimating Health Professional’s Preferences
The Ministry of Health publishes on a webpage information about available
positions, and it includes both an email address and a telephone number where
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Figure 2.1: Histogram of wages offered by hospitals (in Colombian Minimum Monthly
Wage)
questions can be answered8.
Health professionals’ preferences exhibit consistent regularities. They prefer
hospitals close to their current location, higher wages, and hospitals in wealthier
counties (as measured by the UBN-index), as shown in Table 2.3. Overall more
than 90% of health professionals report at a least 3 hospitals. Table 2.3 shows the
regularity of health professionals’ preferences.
Figure 2.2 shows a histogram of the distance to the first reported hospital from
the capital of the state where they were born9. From it we can observe that despite
8For a detailed version of the instructions (in Spanish) go to https://tramites.minsalud.
gov.co/tramitesservicios/DefaultSSO.aspx-Accessed May 2018
9In the Appendix a similar histogram is shown for the distance to the first reported hospital
from the capital of the state of graduation
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Avg. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Med-Lab ranking choice (%) 100 96 96 96 91
Mean Dist. Graduation (km) 446 202 224 264 299 310
Mean Dist. from St. of Origin (km) 476 181 222 245 287 302
UBN index 49 40 46 48 44 44
Wage (MMW) 3.2 3.29 3.33 3.24 3.22 3.22
Same State of Graduation (%) 4 47 39 24 18 8
Same State of Origin (%) 4 56 44 33 20 17
Nurses ranking choice (%) 100 97 90 76 55
Mean Dist. Graduation (km) 488 123 158 172 195 238
Mean Dist. from St. of Origin (km) 493 132 164 178 203 252
UBN index 42 27 30 31 32 33
Wage (MMW) 3.0 3.20 3.12 3.09 3.13 3.11
Same State of Graduation (%) 4 66 56 46 41 34
Same State of Origin (%) 4 64 53 46 39 31
Med-Docs ranking choice (%) 100 95 87 72 54
Mean Dist. Graduation (km) 405 106 106 120 146 161
Mean Dist. from St. of Origin (km) 428 128 139 153 160 188
UBN index 41 23 24 25 24 25
Wage (MMW) 4.49 4.73 4.73 4.68 4.84 4.86
Same State of Graduation (%) 4 70 67 63 55 51
Same State of Origin (%) 4 65 59 54 52 47
Dentists ranking choice (%) 100 97 96 93 72
Mean Dist. Graduation (km) 428 170 183 237 254 285
Mean Dist. from St. of Origin (km) 443 165 182 241 250 284
UBN index 44 34 35 36 37 36
Wage (MMW) 3.6 3.82 3.76 3.82 3.82 3.80
Same State of Graduation (%) 4 51 40 25 20 20
Same State of Origin (%) 4 58 44 30 24 21
Table 2.3: Preferences regularities of Health professionals by Ranking
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having a high average, more than 120km for all health professions, the preference for
distance is highly skewed and most of the health professionals prefer to be close to
the capital of the state where they were born. Overall we observe that the preference
for location, in the sense of being either close to the capital city of the state they
were born or the city where they graduated from, is stronger than the preference
for wage. Moreover, from Table 2.3 we can observe that the reported hospitals
wage is not decreasing while it increases strongly in distance. Nevertheless, health
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Figure 2.2: Travel distance from hospital to capital of state of origin city (km)
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2.3.1 A Random Coefficients Model of Preferences
To model preferences for rural hospitals I use a standard random utility frame-
work. Denote with Uij the utility of health professional i from performing the CSS
at hospital j. I assume that health professionals choose the hospitals that maximize
their utility. Their utility is assumed to depend on the wage offered by the hospital
Wj, the distance to their place of graduation Dij, and a set of characteristics of the
county where the hospital is located Cj, resulting in the following utility:
Uij = Wj + β
D
i Dij + β
H
i Hj + β
C
i Cj + εij (2.1)
Where βDi , β
H
i , and β
M
i represent the weight that health professional i places
on the distance to the town of origin10, the characteristics of the hospital, and the
characteristics of the county where a given hospital is located, respectively. In the
estimation, these variables are interacted with the gender of the health professionals.
Thus, I allow different preference distributions and correlations on the weights by
gender.
I use the same weight on wage for all health professionals in order to find
utilities in a common numeraire, namely nominal wage. In particular, the wage
coefficient is constrained to be equal to 1. Therefore, all else being equal, since all
health professionals are likely to like higher wages, treating the wage as numeraire
is a scale normalization. To estimate their different weights for distance to the
town of origin, and hospital’s town characteristics, I use the reported choices of the
10This distance was calculated using the geocodeopen command in Stata (Anderson, 2013).
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health professionals and a random coefficients model (McFadden and Train (2000),
Train (2009)). Hence, this coefficients allowed to be random in order to allow for
heterogeneity of preference in the choice behavior.
In the data set most health professionals report several hospitals. Each hospital
ranked by each health professional constitutes an observation. The first observation
for each health professional indicates when the first ranked alternative was chosen
among all alternatives. The second(nth) observation identities the case in which the
second alternative was chosen when the first (previous n-1) chosen alternative(s) was
(are) removed. Removing the previously chosen alternatives is important because
it creates variation in the choice set. This variation allows a better prediction of
both the agents’ utilities and the ranking beyond the reported choices. This is so
because when a health professional makes multiple choices that share a common
attribute, I can infer that the individual has a strong preference for that attribute
because independence in the additive error terms across choices makes observing
such a pattern very unlikely.
I assume that εij in equation (2.1) is a distributed i.i.d. extreme value and
captures the idiosyncratic tastes for hospitals. The vector of coefficients β follows a
multivariate normal mixing distribution and therefore allows for preference hetero-
geneity by allowing random coefficients. A dummy variable for each state is included
in the county’s characteristics. The distribution of the weights of these variables is
constrained to have a zero mean. I include these variables to allow for a correlation
between hospitals within the same state, which, in turn, allows for a rich variety
of distribution patterns. This is analogous to a nested logit in which states define
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mutually exclusive nests.
The main assumption in this estimation is that conditional on observed hos-
pital and county characteristics, unobserved idiosyncratic tastes are independent on
wages. A violation to this assumption may occur if, given the controls, health pro-
fessionals prefer hospital offering higher wages. It is unlikely in this case since, as
shown in Table 2.3, preferences regularities show that the preferences for location
are stronger than those for wage. Also, the wages are published by the Ministry of
Health and there is no possibility of negotiation regarding the wage. Therefore, the
wage is orthogonal to the health professionals’ characteristics.
Estimation was carried out using a hierarchical Bayes procedure. Table 2.4
presents the results of the random coefficients estimation of health professional pref-
erences for rural hospitals for a selection of the variables. The distribution of the
weights of the coefficients are consistent with expectations. They show that health
professionals prefer higher wages, being closer to their state of graduation, and
wealthier counties. In all cases there is significant heterogeneity among profession-
als. Moreover, the estimates show that female health professionals have a stronger
preference for staying close to the capital of the state in which they were born. In
the appendix the complete table of the means and standard deviation of the weights
is shown. There it can be observed that the coefficients of the standard deviations
of the dummy variables of states show that there is a significant heterogeneity in
preferences for states. This indicates that the decision by the Ministry of Health to
ask for a ranking of states produced a relatively good description of the rankings.
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2.3.2 Measuring Welfare with the Estimates
The estimated model provides the posteriors of the weights for each health
professional. With these posteriors I estimate the utility of each health professional
at each hospital. However, these estimated utilities need not result in the same
ordinal order implied by the reported preferences. The reported preferences then
introduce restrictions in the unobserved terms εij.
Accurately incorporating the restrictions implied by the reported preferences
plays a central role in the welfare analysis that I develop below. Previous studies,
such as Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017), reveal that higher-ranked alternatives tend to
have the highest unobserved terms. Hence the unobserved role plays an important
role in explaining the observed preferences. In the counterfactuals I use reported
preferred and not reported hospitals utilities. Therefore, it is important to incorpo-
rate the fact that reported hospitals will have a high unobserved term and that the
not reported ones will have a low one. This is done in order for the welfare analysis
not to be driven by the unobserved terms.
In this research I estimate unobserved terms by means of placing restrictions
on the bounds of each εij. The bounds are set in order to maximize the probability
of observing the reported ranking. Denote with Ûdj the estimated utility of health
professional d at hospital j. The constraints imposed by the reported preferences
cause a hospital ranked in the j-th position among N alternatives to satisfy:
Ûdj+1 + εdj+1 > Ûdj + εdj > Ûdj−1 + εdj−1 (2.2)
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Med-Lab Nursing Med-Docs Dentists
Means
Wage
1 1 1 1
Travel Distance Origin
F -1.413 -1.863 -2.455 -1.444
M -1.192 -1.417 -1.798 -1.413
UBN-Index
F -0.056 -0.114 -0.141 -0.083
M -0.023 -0.108 -0.118 -0.109
Coca
F -1.419 -0.644 -1.095 -1.124
M -0.147 -2.013 -0.997 -0.338
Living Place
F 0.866 0.256 0.577 0.587
M 0.163 0.882 0.179 0.541
Weekends Shift
F -2.296 -0.555 -0.176 -1.231
M -0.001 -0.382 -0.114 -0.031
Std. Deviation
Travel Distance Origin
F 1.506 1.427 2.430 1.244
M 1.875 2.202 1.542 1.455
Travel Distance Graduation
F 1.265 2.068 1.862 1.131
M 1.358 2.157 2.736 0.237
UBN-Index
F 0.237 0.667 0.178 0.261
M 0.214 0.603 0.191 0.470
Coca
F 1.630 1.102 1.940 1.252
M 0.568 2.291 0.875 1.012
Living Place
F 1.111 0.663 0.491 1.016
M 0.585 1.254 0.418 0.942
Weekends Shift
F 2.276 1.028 0.414 1.297
M 0.037 0.779 0.329 0.202
Table 2.4: Preference Estimates of Health Professionals
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Therefore, the ranking constraints the possible values the error term εdj can
have. Let εj(ε̄j) denote the lower (upper) bound of εj. The lower (upper) limit of εj
will be bounded by the upper(lower) limit of εj+1 (εj−1) as implied by the following
restriction:
Ûdj+1 + εdj+1 = Ûdj + ε̄dj (2.3)
With N alternatives ranked, there are 2(N − 1) variables because the first
(last) ranked alternative has no restrictions on the upper (lower) bound. Moreover,
there are N − 1 restrictions like the one mentioned above. Thus, the optimization
problem in order to find the maximum probability of observing the ranking is:
max
(εdi,ε̄dj)
logProb(ε ≥ ε1) +
N−1∑
k=2
logProb(ε̄k ≥ ε ≥ εk) + logProb(ε < ε̄N) (2.4)
After having estimated the boundaries for each unobserved term (i.e., the re-
strictions implied by the ranking order of the alternatives), I estimate the expected
value of each term and add them to the expected utilities. These are the final esti-
mates that will be denoted E [uij|ri, Hj, Cj, βi] (the expected utility of professional
i at hospital j given his reports ri), and they are the estimates that will be used to
estimate the counterfactuals.
Denote with E [uij|ri, Hj, Cj, βi] the expected utility of professional i at hos-
pital j given his reports ri, the hospital’s characteristics Hj, the county’s charac-
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teristics Cj, and the estimated coefficients of the professional βi. Also denote with
µ : P → H∪P a matching, such that each professional is assigned either to a single






E [uij|ri, Hj, Cj, βi]
.
The difference between average professional welfare between two matchings, µ
and µ′, is: W̄ (µ)− W̄ (µ′).
2.4 Individual Rationality vs Compulsion
In this section, I test whether the efficiency improvement is high enough to
make the compulsory feature unnecessary. In other words, I test what would happen
if the allocation was based on the individual rationality that the single-offer cen-
tralized allocation mechanisms are built upon. I do this by exploiting the allocation
mechanism changes carried out from 2012 to 2014.
In section 2, I characterized the single-offer centralized mechanism imple-
mented since October 2014. Prior to October 2012, a decentralized system was
used to determine the allocation. Each health professional enrolled in a state, and
among the enrolled health professionals, each state conducted a lottery to deter-
mine the allocation. If in a given state there were more health professionals than
participants, the unassigned professionals were exempt from the CSS. In the final
allocation that used this decentralized mechanism, 135 (out of 380) of the physicians
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enrolled in a state that had only 2 positions available, causing 133 of them to be
exempt.
During the previous two allocations, others applied to the same state with
the goal of not being assigned. In the April (June) 2012 allocation, a total of 74
(225) physicians applied for 6 (7) positions. Because this strategy was used only
in the allocation of physicians, I focus on that profession. Excluding the state just
mentioned, 35 states participated in the allocation, and professionals were exempt
from only 3 of them. Forty-two (42) health professionals were exempted, 39 of whom
came from one state: Valle del Cauca. However, Valle del Cauca had a significant
number of positions available (52) and many graduates in the 2014 allocation. Thus,
I assume that these graduates were not attempting to avoid the allocation.
In 2013, the Ministry of Health established enrollment limits in each state. The
number of enrolled health professionals could not double the number of positions.
This constraint reduced significantly the number of unfilled positions. However, the
fact that there were more exempted physicians than unfilled positions motivated
the ministry to design the centralized mechanism. Due to the presence of this
constraint, I use the 2012 data rather than the 2013 data to find the marginal
utility for physicians of accepting a position.
A similar number of physicians participated in the October 2012 and the Oc-
tober 2014 allocations: 382 in the former and 386 in the latter. Because I do not
observe detailed data on participants in the 2012 allocation, I examine the 2014
participants. I assume that the characteristics of the two cohorts are significantly
similar. To make the 2014 allocation more closely resemble the October 2012 sit-
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uation, I randomly choose the participating positions in the 2014 allocation, when
213 more positions were available, in order to have the same number of positions in
each state.
I simulate the outcome that would have occurred if the decentralized mech-
anism used in 2012 had still been in use in October 2014. I model the decision of
physicians of enrolling to their preferred state (in order to work for one year) or to
avoid being allocated11 To this end I use information about the rankings of states
submitted by physicians. For those physicians who did not modify the default rank-
ing of states, and who, therefore, reported them in alphabetical order, I use their
state of origin as the preferred state. I assume that had the decentralized mecha-
nism still being in place and that in the lottery physicians would have enrolled in
their reported preferred state. I do not find significant differences when I include
the state of graduation.
I estimate the average marginal utility a physician would require in order
not to avoid being allocated. I do so by making, in equilibrium, the number of
physicians that decide to avoid being allocated the same as the ones that applied
to the state that had 2 positions in 2012. I estimate this marginal utility to be 1.91
Colombian Monthly Minimum Wages. Notice that I assume this marginal utility
remained the same in 2012 and 2014. Given that the percentage of the PIB spent
on health in Colombia between 2012 and 2014 increased from 4.47% to 4.64%, the
aforementioned value is most likely to have increased.
11I use the simplifying assumption that when a health professional applies to the state with 2
positions with a probability of 1 she is not assigned.
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I then simulate the outcome of the October 2014 allocation if there had been
voluntary participation–that is, if the physicians had been able to apply only for
positions that yielded them a utility higher than the aforementioned acceptance
threshold. I find that about 115 (30%) of the physicians would have been unas-
signed. Notice that the number of physicians that would be left unassigned under
the centralized mechanism (115) is similar to the number of physicians that strate-
gized to avoid being allocated (133). This is so despite the fact that the average
utility of the assigned physician went from 2.95 Colombian Monthly Minimum Wages
to 6.02 Colombian Monthly Minimum Wages. In other words, for the policy to be
successful assignments need to be mandatory.
Notice that this counterfactual has been carried out in an allocation that has
low congestion, when about 3 positions were available for each physician. Allocations
conducted in January and July tend to be much more congested. A higher congestion
is likely to cause a lower utility per allocated physician. Hence, the compulsory
feature is important for the program’s success.
Another way to motivate physicians to participate in the hospital allocation
is to increase wages. Figure 2.3 shows the number of physicians who would be
allocated if the wage was increased optimally for the vacant positions. The term
”optimally” refers to the fact that filling the first position comes at a lower cost
than filling the second one. The results show that an average increase of 600 USD
(2 Colombian Minimum Monthly Wages) would cause 35 more physicians to be allo-
cated. This would entail having about 82 physicians not being allocated while having
many options to choose from. Therefore, the alternative to making compulsory the
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Figure 2.3: Increase of Physicians Allocated with Wage
participation of raising optimally the wages implies a very high cost.
Increasing the wage is also a competing way to motivate physicians to be al-
located to the positions in the participating hospitals. Figure 2.3 shows the number
of physicians that would be allocated if the wage was increased optimally for the
vacant positions. Optimally refers to the fact that filling the first position comes
at a lower cost than filling the second one. The results show that an average in-
crease of 600USD (2 Colombian Minimum Monthly Wages of the time) would result
in 35 more physicians being allocated – resulting in an allocation rate change of
10%. This would entail having about 82 physicians not being allocated while hav-
ing many options to choose from. Therefore, the alternative to making compulsory
the participation of raising optimally the wages implies a very high cost.
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2.5 Comparing Alternative Mechanisms
The CSS’s design, as a centralized mechanism, was built on the assumption
that the cost of rejecting a position was so high, that no health professional would
do so. However, in practice it has been observed that, depending on the profession,
about 4% − 6% of the positions are rejected. Hence, improving the welfare of the
health professionals will also have the purpose of reducing the aforementioned rate of
rejections. I incorporate the fact that positions are rejected on the welfare estimates
by calculating the outside value of rejection in order to have, on average, the same
rejection rates in each profession as observed.
In this section, I will compare the welfare in terms of efficiency for the health
professionals and estimated rejection rate of different algorithms. Then I will discuss
the welfare implications of changing the total number of hospitals in the ranking
of health professionals. The properties and trade-offs in matching were already
described in Chapter 1.
In the physians case, the fact that there are almost 3 positions per each pro-
fessional makes the allocative analysis futile. This is due to the fact that a high
share of health professionals is getting what they want. Therefore, in this section I
will focus on the efficiency analysis of the other professions, i.e. the ones that were
significantly congested. For those professions, in contrast to the results reported
by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017) and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) that conclude for
their settings that any algorithm modification has a second order relevance when
compared to DA, I observe that in this case there are significant welfare gains from
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the fine-tuning of the mechanism.
The following example illustrates a case in which having one more professional
than available positions precipitates significant welfare costs for the allocated health
professionals:
Suppose there are 4 health professionals, denoted with hpi∈1−4, and three
hospitals with one positions each, which are denoted with Hi∈1−3 with the following
preferences and priorities:
Php1 Php2 Php3 Php4 PrH1 PrH2 PrH3
H2 H3 H2 H2 hp3 hp2 hp1
H1 H1 H3 H1 hp4 hp4 hp4
H3 H2 H1 H3 hp2 hp3 hp3
hp1 hp1 hp2
The allocation determined by using DA is: (hp1, H3)(hp2, H2)(hp3, H1) and
leaving hp4 unassigned. However, had hp4 not been present, the allocation would
have been: (hp1, H1)(hp2, H3)(hp3, H2). This allocation is strictly preferred by every
allocated health professional. Therefore, the costs of congestion can be substantial.
2.5.1 Competing Mechanisms
I compare the welfare output of different algorithms, all of which satisfy the
minimizing unfilled positions property. The results derive from simulating the tie-
breaks and determining the allocation with them 100 times. The implemented
mechanism is based on the DA algorithm, which is known to be strategy-proof and
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efficient.
If a priority structure is strict, then it would Pareto-dominate any other allo-
cation that respects priorities; however, this expectation does not necessarily hold
in this case because the priority structure is significantly coarse (Erdil and Ergin,
2008). A policy maker that is willing to sacrifice some strategy-proofness for ef-
ficiency, would use the SOSM12. This algorithm improves the allocation upon the
one resulting from DA by removing the welfare-decreasing cycles induced by use
of the tie-break. I find that the SOSM yields few welfare gains for all professions.
This is so because I use a single-tie break rather than multiple ones. The Appendix
describes other mechanisms under both single and multiple tie-break scenarios.
The second mechanism I compare to the implemented mechanism uses the
TTC algorithm to determine allocation. This approach makes each allocation ef-
ficient and maintains the strategy-proofness property. Each subject who has the
highest priority at a hospital is endowed with a seat and is allowed to trade posi-
tions. The trade does not take priorities into account, and, consequently, priority
violations are allowed in the resulting allocations. For example, two health pro-
fessionals with the highest priorities at a hospital may exchange their positions at
that hospital even thou they have the lowest priority in the hospital they are receiv-
ing. Indeed, we observe that violations do occur and they involve on average 13-27
professionals. Comparing these two mechanisms reveals that in this scenario with
strategy-proof mechanisms, due to the aforementioned heterogeneity of preferences,
12SOSM stands for the Student Optimal Stable Match. In this setting this algorithm produces a
Health Professional Optimal Respecting Priorities Match.
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there is no trade-off between efficiency and respecting priorities (Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez, 2003). The welfare gains achieved from moving to this mechanisms
are not significant. However, the rejection rate is reduced by in 1 unit.
In a unique characteristic of the implemented mechanism, preferences are com-
pleted for each health professional using the reported ranking of states. As noted
below in a discussion of welfare analysis, this fact generates significant competition
between the health professionals for positions. Furthermore, imposing the strategy-
proofness condition with completed preferences comes at a first order cost in welfare.
The next mechanisms proposed are designed to limit competition for positions be-
tween health professionals in order to obtain significant welfare gains. They belong
to a family of mechanisms that uses ranked-priorities, i.e. a priority given to a health
professional because of where she ranked the hospital. The proposed mechanisms
yield higher welfare than the TTC and the first one respects priorities. We conclude
that in this case the strategy-proofness property is much more costly in terms of
efficiency than the respecting priorities property.
The third proposed mechanism is to break ties in favor of the professionals
who report a hospital. This modifies how the mechanism handles ties in priority,
and it meets the respect priorities criterion. Regarding incentives to report the
truth, a professional might want to misreport his preferences in order to get an
exemption, yet this action could induce a strategic behavior equivalent to the one
that occurs when truncated lists are reported Haeringer and Klijn (2009). A position
undesired by all professionals cannot be avoided. The welfare gains from moving
to this mechanism range from 6% − 8%. Notice that this mechanism respects all
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priorities. As of the rejection rate, it is predicted to be reduced to 2%.
The final proposed mechanism uses two rounds. In the first round, the set
of allocations uses only the reported hospitals. In the second round, the remaining
hospitals use the state rankings. This mechanism presents professionals with the
highest incentives to manipulate: if a professional avoids being matched in the first
round she is very unlikely to be matched in the second. This mechanism is a version
of the Parallel DA mechanism used in China to determine college admissions (Chen
and Kesten, 2017). The welfare gains achieved by moving to this mechanism can be
as high as 55%. Again, this gain carries the cost that occurs when the priorities of
many health professionals are not respected (as is the case of Nursing with around
101). Table 2.5 summarizes the results when these mechanisms are compared.
In contrast to the results reported by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017) and Ab-
dulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) who conclude that for their settings any algorithm modifi-
cation has a second-order relevance compared to DA, I find that when the mechanism
is fine-tuned, significant welfare gains are achieved.
2.5.2 How many hospitals to report?
In the alternative mechanisms discussed in the previous section, allowing re-
ported preferences to have an edge produces significant welfare gains. In this section
I explore what would happen if a truncated DA was used–a condition that is con-
sistent with the majority of school choice applications, whose reports need to be
68
truncated 13. In this application professionals were asked to report up to five hos-
pitals. The number was not decided using a technical motivation.
In the next set of counterfactuals, the change in welfare is conditional on the
number of hospitals that professionals are allowed to report using DA with truncated
reports. In all of these cases I assume that professionals report truthfully–that is,
when allowed to report N hospitals, they report their preferred ones. Therefore,
when they are allowed to report five (5) or less, I use their reported hospitals.
When professionals report more than the reported number, I use those that have
the highest estimated welfare. Figure 2.4 summarizes the results. Interestingly, due
to the fact that the physicians allocation was not congested, their utility increases
with the number of positions. For the other professions, the number is four or five.
There is a trade-off in hand with the number of positions reported. On the one
hand, the higher the number of hospitals reported the higher the share of positions
allocated. On the other, the higher the competition between health professionals for
these positions and hence the lower the welfare of the allocated health profession-
als. Due to the preference heterogeneity and the congestion of some markets, the
maximum is achieved at a low number of positions for the very congested markets
(Nursing and Dentistry) while achieving it at a high number for the other ones.
In most of the environments where DA is used, there is a truncation of possible
reports. To reduce the cost of congestion while allocating all positions, I propose
the following modification of the termination rule of the deferred acceptance algo-
13Rumania and Boston are the only cases I know of in which the number of options that can





































































































































Figure 2.4: Average Change in Utility with Number of Hospitals Reported
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rithm: The algorithm terminates when there are no new proposals, when all the
positions are enrolled, or when all rejected students have exhausted their ranking.
This mechanism is not strategy proof: a professional may want to modify his reports
in order to precipitate an early termination of the algorithm. However, it would be
difficult to manipulate because the odds of inducing early termination are roughly
one over the number of professionals. This modification is advantageous because
under it exempt professionals would not need to “apply” to and be rejected by each
hospital. That said, the mechanism does not respect priorities; it could end a health
professional’s exemptions before she is given the chance to a apply to hospitals in
which she has a high priority. The modification of the termination rule would result
in welfare increases of 8− 9% and a significant drop in rejection rates.
Another mechanism can also be applied to this problem: add the reported
hospital priority and modify the termination rule of the DA algorithm. Under this
and the previous mechanism, the same manipulation incentives would be present,
yet welfare would increase 9− 12% and rejection rates would drop significantly.
2.6 Merit-based tie-break
The SaberPro is an end-of-study nationwide exam. To graduate all students in
all fields of study in the country must take the test, which is used to decide admis-
sions into Colombian graduate studies. In this section I analyze what would happen
if the exam results were used to break ties within the coarse priority structure. In
a procedure known as merit-based tie-breaking, this process is standard procedure
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Welfare Num. of Num. of Allo. % of
Gains Prof. with Prof. with Pos.
vs DA (%) Not Respected Not Respected Rejected
Priorities Priorities
Med-Lab
Implemented Mechanism 0 0 0 5
TTC 5 14 0.2 4
DA-Stopping 8 9 0.3 1
Report TB 9 0 0 3
DA Stopping+Report TB 12 10 1 0
Sequential DA 13 13 0.1 1
SOSM 0 0 0 4
Resp. Prio. Allo. 2 3 0 4
Nursing
Implemented Mechanism 0 0 0 4
TTC 0 14 0 3
DA-Stopping 8 88 0 3
Report TB 5 0 0 4
DA Stopping+Report TB 9 89 0 3
Sequential DA 8 112 0 0
SOSM 0 0 0 4
Resp. Prio. Allo. 0 2 0 4
Med-Doc
Implemented Mechanism 0 0 0 4
TTC 0 26 26 4
DA-Stopping 0 0 0 4
Report TB 1 0 0 4
DA Stopping+Report TB 1 0 0 4
Sequential DA 1 9 9 4
SOSM 0 0 0 4
Resp. Prio. Allo. 0 0 0 4
Dentistry
Implemented Mechanism 0 0 0 3
TTC 2 11 0.13 2
DA-Stopping 9 64 0 1
Report TB 9 0 0 1
DA Stopping+Report TB 12 64 0 1
Sequential DA 12 65 0 0
SOSM 0 0 0 3
Resp. Prio. Allo. 2 4 0 2
Table 2.5: Comparison Between Different Algorithms (Complete Preferences)72
Med-Lab Nurses Med-Docs Dentists
Worse 10 34 85 11
(1.47) (2.83) (3.23) (2.69)
Same 11 28 213 31
(5,96) (5.78) (7.36) (6.71)
Better 60 86 74 54
(3.4) (3.04) (6.45) (3.52)
Table 2.6: Merit-based vs Random Tie-break
in several school choice settings.
I recovered the results for 189 (out of 196) Medical Lab Scientists, 713 (out of
828) Nurses, 337(out of 386) physicians, and 661 (out of 708) Dentists. The tests
usually consist of two sections: a generic section that is the same for all fields; and an
advanced section specific to each field. Unfortunately, the advanced sections specific
to particular fields were modified many times prior to the October 2014 allocation.
Consequently, to break the ties in the priority structure, I use as the means the
average in the generic portion of the test.
As in the previous sections, I run 100 simulations of the allocation using the
random tie-break, and I compare it to the allocation produced by the merit-based
approach. Table 2.6 shows the results. In the case of the allocation of physicians,
because there are more positions than physicians, the quality of these positions is a
zero sum game. Hence, the more desired positions have a higher chance of receiving
good physicians, which generates inequality within the country in the quality of the
allocated professionals.professionals. This outcome is contrary to the objective of
the program, which is to give rural communities the chance to acquire good health
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professionals.
When the merit-based approach is applied to the other professions, congestion
leads to a significant increase in the average quality of allocated health professionals,
from which most hospitals benefit. However, in some states, regional priorities cause
health professionals to be redistributed, and this negatively affects some hospitals.
With regards to the welfare of health professionals, I do not observe a significant
change int he average welfare when there is a merit-based tie break.
2.7 Robustness Check
The accuracy of the statements about welfare made in the previous sections
depend naturally on the accuracy of the preference estimates. These estimates are
based on the assumption that the reported preferences are the true preferences.
Beyond the fact that the allocation is determined using the DA algorithm, there are
several reasons to make this assumption.
As noted above, a professional cannot manipulate the allocation to achieve
an exemption. A health professionals’ strongest motivation to report strategically
would be to over-report positions in their state of origin or graduation because
doing so would give them a higher priority. This, in turn, would produce a higher
probability of allocation. Two regularities show that this strategy would not be
effective. First, as reported in Table 3, states that give a higher priority experience
a decrease in their ranking position. Indeed, Haeringer and Klijn (2009) show that
in the truncated DA there are no incentives to misreport preferences within the
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of Health Professionals Allocated by Rank
reported preferences. The same result holds in the environment that I examine here.
In other words, health professionals have no incentive to misreport preferences. If
the last positions reported had a higher probability of being from a priority-giving
state, this would constitute evidence of strategic behavior, but I have found no
such evidence. In fact, I observe that the probability of being allocated to the last
reported hospital is lower than the probability of being allocated to the second-to-
last reported hospital, as shown in Figure 2.5.
Second, the greater the congestion in a allocation, the greater the incentives
to report a priority giving state. This should produce a higher weight in the travel
distance coefficient. However, as Table 2.4 shows, the biggest average weight of
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travel costs is observed in the least congested allocation (that of physicians).
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Chapter 3: School Choice with Rank Priorities
3.1 Introduction
Market design is known as the field of designing practical allocation mech-
anisms. It has been successfully applied to a number of cases. The literature is
divided into two main topics: matching and auctions. The main difference between
them arises from them is that they are thought to take opposite sides in the cardi-
nal/ordinal utility spectrum (Abdulkadiroğlu and Ausubel, 2016).
In this chapter, I revisit one of the most studied problems on the matching side
of market design: school choice. In doing so, I assume that agents have cardinal utili-
ties instead of the traditional ordinal ones. Within this problem a long-lasting debate
concerns use of the Immediate Acceptance mechanism (also known as Boston) in sev-
eral school districts in the US to allocate students to schools (Kesten and Ünver,
2015). Use of Immediate Acceptance is problematic because, as Abdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez (2003) have demonstrated, it has several undesirable properties.
I use the allocation of health professionals in Colombia studied in the previous
chapter to conduct counterfactuals. In particular I use the estimates of the pref-
erences of medical lab scientists that participated in the October 2014 allocation.







j = s1 0.8 0.8 0.6
j = s2 0.2 0.2 0.4
j = s3 0 0 0
Table 3.1: Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2011) example
cardinal utility and this allows to unveil the intensity of preferences. While there are
other papers that follow this approach,1 I am unaware of other studies that compute
a data supported Nash equilibrium of the IA mechanism allocation. This enables
the comparison between mechanisms such as DA and IA.
The research most closely related theoretically to this one is Abdulkadiroğlu
et al. (2011). They too, take a cardinal utility approach to studying the school choice
problem and show, in a highly specialized setting, that when the priorities used by
schools are completely coarse and the preferences of students completely correlated,
the Immediate Acceptance mechanism may outperform the DA mechanism in terms
of ex-ante Pareto efficiency. I reproduce their Example 1 to illustrate the efficiency
gains that manipulable mechanisms may entail. Suppose three students, 1, 2, 3 are
assigned to three schools, s1, s2, s3, each with one seat. Assume further that students
have von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities and the same priority at each school. Let
vji be the utility of student i at school j. Table 3.1 shows the information of this
example.
Note that student 3 benefits by reporting (s2  s1  s3) instead of the truthful
(s1  s2  s3) when the mechanism used is IA, since this guarantees him a seat
1see for example (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017) and Hastings et al. (2009).
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at s2. Note also that the expected welfare for each student under DA is 0.33 due
to the fact that they have the same probability of being assigned at each school.
However, once student 3 misreports his preferences, the expected welfare for each
student under IA is 0.4 in the Nash equilibrium.
I show that the ex-ante efficiency gains in situations similar to the one de-
picted by the example above are not exclusive to the IA mechanism. Using the
axiomatization of the IA mechanism provided by Kojima and Ünver (2014) I show,
as a corollary to that theorem, that the IA mechanism is isomorphic to a DA when
ranked priorities are placed on top of the priorities otherwise used in DA. I de-
fine the priorities traditionally used in DA as exogenous. This framework naturally
suggests a new mechanism, namely the one that arises when ranked priorities are
located below the exogenous priorities. I show that because ranked priorities are
located above the exogenous priorities, the IA mechanism fails to respect priorities.
The new proposed mechanism allows priorities to be violated but only as a result
of untruthful reporting. I define a new property this mechanism satisfies, a weaker
version of respecting priorities, that I call claim free. Therefore, this new mechanism
is defined as Claim Free Boston mechanism. Recently, it has been shown by Kapor
et al. (2017) that this mechanism has been used in New Haven to allocate students
to schools.
Going one step further I define a family of mechanisms that satisfy the claim
free property. This family of mechanisms depend on how strict or coarse ranked
priorities are. In one end, when the ranked priorities added are completely coarse
in the sense that ranking a school in any position gives the same ranked priority,
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results in the usual DA. When the opposite is true, i.e. when ranking a school higher
gives strictly higher ranked priorities, the Claim Free Boston is obtained.
I conduct a counterfactual analysis using the estimates of the Medical Lab Sci-
ence professional utilities at the Compulsory Social Service. I compare the aggregate
welfare resulting from using the IA,DA, and the family of claim-free mechanisms. I
find no evidence that moving to manipulable mechanisms results in higher aggregate
welfare of the medical lab scientists.
This chapter is divided as follows. Section 2 defines and motivates the new
family of mechanisms that satisfies the claim free property. Section 3 describes the
Compulsory Social Service and the Medical Lab Science cohort used for the results.
Section 4 outlines the details of the counterfactual analysis and discusses the results.
3.2 Claim Free Boston
In the school choice problem, the priority structure traditionally is very coarse
because it usually involves only two student priorities: having a sibling in the school
or living in the neighborhood served by the school. I define these as the exogenous
priorities of the problem. The priorities are complemented with a random tie-break
to determine the allocation in any either IA, DA, or TTC algorithms.
Kojima and Ünver (2014) provide an axiomatization of the IA mechanism.
They show in their Theorem 1 that the characteristics that define the IA mechanism
are favoring higher ranks and satisfying consistency, resource monotonicity, and
rank-respecting invariance. I develop next a corollary of that theorem that relates
80
IA and DA. Suppose the priority structure of a school choice problem had rank
priorities on top of the exogenous priorities. In this case, the priority structure
would be:
Rank 1: Students who ranked the school first.
Rank 2: Students who ranked the school second.
...
Rank k: Students who ranked the school in the k-th position.
Exo: Exogenously given priorities.
R: Random tie-break.
With this definition in mind I can state and prove the following corollary to
the axiomatization of the IA mechanism.
corollary 3.1. Given the same random tie-break, the allocation using IA Algorithm
is the same as the one with DA with the above priority structure.
Proof. (Induction) The allocation of both algorithms is the same in the first step.
If a student is assigned in the first step under DA, then his or her final assignment
will be that school because in the following steps only students who have ranked the
school lower will apply. The same holds for professionals who were first assigned to
a hospital at any step of the algorithm.
This formulation explains why the IA mechanism does not respect priorities.
When rank priorities are given a higher status than the exogenous ones, with whom
the respecting priorities property is defined, exogenous priorities become vulnerable.
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This framework naturally suggests a new mechanism- the one generated by
adding rank priorities below the exogenous ones. I define this new mechanism as
Claim Free Boston. Adding these rank priorities gives the priority structure of
the schools some endogeneity and, therefore, it comes at the cost of losing strategy
proofness.
In the IA mechanism a student risks “losing” any exogenous priorities when-
ever he or she does not ranking a school first. Under the Claim Free Boston this
does not happens, and, thus, as the name suggests, the mechanism is claim-free. Ad-
ditionally, the chance that any subject will deviate from reporting truthfully should
be lower than in the IA mechanism. Finally, in contrast to the TTC, students under
the Claim Free Boston are not allowed to trade their priorities, and this comes at a
cost: the mechanism is still not being ordinal-Pareto efficient.
Notice that in the example provided in the introduction the Claim Free Boston
mechanism accomplishes the same cardinal utility as IA. The gains from this mech-
anism arise when a student who deviates from her or his true preferences earns a
higher probability of being allocated to a least preferred school, which increases the
chance that others will get into one of their preferred schools. Hence, the gains from
this mechanism occur in the cardinal utility.
3.2.1 Deferred Acceptance with Rank Priorities
The Claim Free Boston mechanism defined in the previous section has a very
particular structure in its ranked priorities: it gives a higher priority to a higher
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ranked alternative. However, there are many possibilities for ranked priorities. For
example one can give the highest ranked priority if an alternative is ranked first or
second while otherwise giving no priority. I define a rank priority structure as a
function π : Z++ → Z++ that is interpreted as ranking an alternative in position
k ∈ Z++ results in a ranked priority of π(k) for that alternative. Ranking an
alternative in position k ∈ Z++ yields a higher ranked priority to ranking it in
position w ∈ Z++ if π(k) < π(w). The ranked priority structure of both the IA and
the claim free Boston mechanisms is π(k) = k.
I define two properties over ranked priorities functions: monotonicity and unit
increments. Monotonicity is defined as the fact that for any r, r′ ∈ Z++, if r < r′
then π(r) ≤ π(r′). This property implies that ranking an alternative higher should
always weakly increase its ranked priority. Not having this property may result
in the undesirable case of an individual ranking an unfeasible school for the sole
purpose of earning a higher priority in a lower ranked alternative. Unit increments
property is defined as the fact that if r ∈ π−1 and r 6= 1 then r − 1 ∈ π−1. This
property implies that giving the k-th priority to a ranked position only makes sense
if some other position has the (k − 1)-th priority.
In the Compulsory Social Service, health professionals are allowed to report
5 rural hospitals. In these cases, 16 monotonic and unit increment ranked priority
structures are possible. In the next section I analyze the allocations that result
from adding each of these possible ranked priorities below the exogenous priorities.
I denote the mechanism that results from adding the ranked priority structure π(1) =
1, π(2) = W ,π(3) = X,π(4) = Y , and π(5) = Z below the exogenous priorities as
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Figure 3.1: Complete Partial Ordering of Rank Priorities
DA + RP (1WXY Z). In this case, the claim free Boston mechanism is DA +
RP (12345).
The monotonicity and unit increment property induces a complete partial
order to the family of possible ranked priority structures. The top (bottom) element
of the order will be the claim free Boston (DA) mechanism. Figure 3.1 shows what
CPO of priority structures look like when it is possible to report up to five choices.
3.3 Comparing Different Allocation Mechanisms
The Compulsory Social Service allocation of health professionals in Colombia
was created to tackle the problem of inequality in the allocation of health profes-
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sionals to rural areas in Colombia. Since October 2014, the allocation has been
determined by the Ministry of Health using a version of Gale and Shapley (1962)
deferred acceptance.
The health professions that participate in the Compulsory Social Service are
Medical Lab Science, Medicine, Nursing, and Dentistry. In this chapter I focus
on the allocation of Medical Lab Scientists. I make this selection because this
allocation had the smallest number of participants (n = 182). Recall that when
dealing with manipulable mechanisms, I find Nash Equilibiums in this setting. This
a computationally intense task. On top of the number of participants, each one has
a strategy set of more than 30,000 alternatives. Therefore, the allocation of Medical
Lab Scientists provides us with an interesting setting while having a small number
of players, which makes the aforementioned exercise feasible to compute.
The following types of priorities are used to define the priority structure of
hospitals in the CSS. First are the priorities that follow from regulations of the
Health Ministry. These are given to professionals who either are mothers with small
children or who have impairments, disabilities, or are in need of special medical
treatment. During the period of study, only 6% of the Medical Lab Scientists had
these priorities. They included 7 pregnant women, 1 mother or father with small
children, and 2 professionals with special treatment needs. The second and infe-
rior type prioritizes location. Hospitals had to give priority to professionals who
graduated from their state (departamento) and to professionals who were born in
their state (departamento). The remaining 94% of medical lab scientists had these
priorities. Therefore, two professionals who were born and graduated from the same
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state will tie in priority at all hospitals. Since these ties are broken randomly, the
allocation has a high degree of randomness.
The types of priorities used to define the priority structure of hospitals in the
CSS is the following. First type of priorities were the ones that follow from regula-
tions of the Health Ministry. These priorities are given by being to a professional
who is a mother with small children or having impairments, disabilities, or needs
of a special medical treatment. Only 6% of the Medical Lab Scientists had any
of these priorities, in particular there were 7 pregnant women, 1 mother of father
with small children, and 2 professionals with needs for special treatments partici-
pated. The second and inferior type of priorities location priorities. Hospitals had
to give priority to professionals who graduated from their state (departamento) and
to professionals who were born in their state (departamento). These were the only
priorities the other 94% of the medical lab scientists had. This results many health
professionals tying in priority at the any given hospital, i.e. the priority structure
was significantly coarse. As such, the allocation had a high degree of randomness
since ties in priorities were broken using a single tie-break.
I use the estimates found in Chapter 2, which employ a random coefficients
model that allows me to capture the heterogeneity of preferences among medical lab
scientists. The preferences have a vertical component (the wage offered) and several
horizontal ones (e.g., location). I
nd that the horizontal component outweighs the vertical one and as such the
preferences are significantly heterogeneous. Moreover, the estimates are consistent
with expectations. The means of the coefficients show that bacteriologists prefer
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higher wages and being closer to their town of origin. They also prefer wealthier
and safer municipalities and municipalities that have a higher number of health
institutions. Regarding the variance of the coefficients, I find that only the coeffi-
cients on wage, travel distance, and staying within the same state are heterogeneous
among the professionals. Moreover, all three of them are positively correlated.
Finally, I define the family of DA+RP (1XYWZ)(Boston+RP (1XYWZ))
mechanism as those that arise from adding RP (1XYWZ) below (above) the weak
priority structure of the hospitals and determining the allocation with DA over those
priorities and the lists of professionals. I am limiting to five the slots that can be
given a ranked priority because in the implemented mechanism medical lab scientists
are allowed to report only five options. Notice that in this case, because the ranking
of hospitals is completed for each professional, the matchings that result from the
DA and DA+RP (11111) (Boston+RP (11111)) are the same. This is so because
a professional who ranked a hospital cannot “lose” the position with one who did
not.
I conduct simulations of the allocations for DA, IA, and the families of mech-
anisms of DA+Rank Priorities and Boston+Rank Priorities discussed above. For
each mechanism, I simulate the allocations using 20 draws of the random tie-breaking
and analyze each of them under two treatments. In the first simulation, I assume
that the medical lab scientists behave naively and, consequently, they report their
preferences truthfully at all mechanisms. This is the truthful reporting treatment.
In the second simulation, I find a full information Nash equilibrium with limited
consideration. In this case full information means that the agents are able to cal-
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culate exactly the probability of being assigned to any given hospital by reporting
it at any position. This implies that they know the realization of the 20 draws
of the tie-break and that each one has an equal probability of being used2. The
same draws are used for all mechanisms. Limited consideration comes from the fact
that I assume that each medical lab scientist is only aware of its eight preferred
alternatives. This constraint limits the strategic space of each agent and makes the
computation of a Nash equilibrium feasible.
Despite the fact that the choice literature has points out a number of situa-
tions and the consequences for welfare analysis of boundedly-rational individuals,
I have no evidence that this is the case for the particular setting examined in this
research. Medical lab scientists face a crucial decision and the number of alterna-
tives (81) is small relative to the importance of the decision at hand. Therefore,
the aforementioned restriction is included only because it eases the computational
burden and not because of any resemblance with reality or behavioral assumptions.
This is a very complex environment in which the strategy space of each agent
is huge and, as a result, the number of Nash equilibrium is very large. The claim
here is that a subset of the possible Nash equilibriums is found for each case, while
it is acknowledged that there are many others. However, in each case the Nash
equilibrium is calculated the same way, using iterative best response. Medical lab
scientists initially report their true preferences and then are asked, one at a time
in a fixed order, their best response given the others reports. To calculate the best








j = s1 0.8 0.6 0.6
j = s2 0.2 0.4 0.4
j = s3 0 0 0
Table 3.2: Coordination Problem
responses, I use the probability of allocation at a hospital (conditional on the position
reported) and the preference estimates obtained using the random coefficients model.
The iterative best response is done one at a time because the Nash equilibrium
might entail two participants with the same utilities who report different preferences.
An example of such a case is the following modification of the earlier example.
Suppose three students, 1, 2, 3 are assigned to three schools, s1, s2, s3, each of which
has one seat. Assume further that students have von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities
and the same priority at each school. Let vji be the utility of student i at school j.
Table 3.2 shows the information of this example.
Note that in this case, both students 2 and 3 benefit from reporting (s2  s1 
s3) instead of the truthful (s1  s2  s3) under IA only if the other student reports
truthfully. This example has two Nash Equilibriums: one where only student 2
misrepresents his preferences and one where student 3 does.
Therefore, when the previous example is played statically, a coordination prob-
lem arises from students 2 and 3. Finding the Nash Equilibrium through iterative
best responses, one participant at the time, solves the aforementioned problem. In
the previous example, the participant (among students 2 and 3) who is asked to
best response will optimally choose to misrepresent his preferences.
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3.4 Results and discussion
Once the final allocations are determined for each mechanism under both the
truthful and Nash treatments, the aggregate welfare is calculated in each case. I
normalize the aggregate welfare of the DA truthful reporting to 1, so that the results
are interpreted as percentage gain relative to the mechanism implemented- namely
DA. Figure 3.2 shows the results of the computation of the aggregate welfare average


























































































From DA to Boston

































































From DA to New Haven - Welfare
(b) Aggregate Welfare - From DA to
New Haven
Figure 3.2: Aggregate Welfare
Examining which mechanism the Ministry of Health should use, I conclude
that significant improvements can be made by changing the pure-DA mechanism.
There is no evidence that significant welfare gains are achieved by moving towards
manipulable mechanisms.
To measure the manipulability of the different mechanisms, I compare the
Chowkoski Information difference between the true preferences and the ones re-
ported in the Nash Equilibrium setting. The Chowkoski Information measures the
number of pairwise switches between the true and the Nash Equilibrium prefer-
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ences. For example, if the true preferences are H1  H2  H3 and the reported
one is H1  H3  H2, then the Chowkoski Measure between the two is 1. Figure
3.3 shows the results of the computation of the manipulability measures of each


































































































From DA to Boston - Strategy




































































































From DA to New Haven - Strategy
(b) Manipulability - From DA to New
Haven
Figure 3.3: Manipulability
We can easily observe that a significant amount of strategizing is happening
in the most manipulable mechanisms. This result is important because it rejects
a possible explanation of the lack of welfare gains: that not much strategizing is
occuring. In this scenario, it is the case that when all participants are strategizing,
non-strategic behavior results in a running to keep in the same place.
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Chapter 4: Aftermath of the Centralized Clearinghouse Implemen-
tation and Conclusions
4.1 Aftermath of the Centralized Clearinghouse Implementation
The centralized clearinghouse used to determine the allocation of health pro-
fessionals for the Compulsory Social Service program was implemented in October
2014. Since then it has been used to determine the allocations. Before it was imple-
mented, a system of decentralized lotteries marred with incentive flaws was used to
determine the allocation. The key purpose of the program, taking health profession-
als to under-served areas was not being fulfilled. Evidence of this was the vacancy
rate of positions for physicians of about 50%. This was specially troublesome since
there were more physicians participating in the program than positions.
After the implementation of the centralized clearinghouse as a mean to deter-
mine the allocation, the vacancy rates have decreased by an order of magnitude.
Currently the vacancy rate of positions if of 5% and it is because of health profes-
sionals rejecting their allocated hospital. Therefore, the Colombia transitioned from
having about 1450 newly graduate professionals in rural areas in 2012 to 2750 in
2015- a significant increment in the professionals labor force for under-served areas.
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Barriers to Healthcare Acces - Colombia
2014 2015 2016
Urban 5.4 5.9 4.0
Rural 9.9 8.5 5.9
Table 4.1: Evolution of the Barriers to Healthcare Access Index in Colombia
Since 2011, Colombia measures the poverty levels with a poverty multidimen-
sional index. One particular index is the barriers to healthcare access. Table 4.1
shows the evolution of the index mentioned above. Colombian rural population, the
main target of the program, has now a much higher access to healthcare services
as shown in the fact that the above index went from 9.9% in 2014 to 5.9% in 2016.
Colombia is know close to achieving the World Bank’s objective of having 97% of
the population with healthcare coverage.
Among the 15 indexes that are recorded in the multidimensional poverty index,
Barriers to Healthcare Acces was the one that contributed the most in reducing
poverty in 2016. This is infact a surprise given that the health indexes are the best
performing indicators in the multidimensional poverty index.
4.2 Conclusions
This dissertation evaluates the Compulsory Social Service (CSS), a program
developed by Colombia’s Ministry of Health to tackle inequality in the allocation of
the country’s health professionals. This is a long-standing policy concern in many
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countries because of the difficulty of filling medical positions in rural areas. A salient
characteristic of this program is that it is compulsory: health professionals in the
areas of Medical-Lab Science, Dentistry, Nursing, and Medicine must participate
in this allocation to become professionally certified. This characteristic makes the
studied clearinghouse different than any other studied in the literature despite entry
level clearinghouse have been extensively used in other settings.
Since October 2014, the allocation has been determined by a single-offer cen-
tralized mechanism that uses the Deferred Acceptance algorithm to determine the
allocation. Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical motivations that pointed towards the
use of that particular algorithm among many others that have been proposed in the
literature. The main idea in that chapter is how to adapt the mechanisms that have
been used in other settings to an environment that is compulsory in nature.
I then, in chapter 2, use the data on the reported preferences in the first
allocation, which was conducted in October 2014, to estimate the preferences of
each health professional for every hospital. I estimate a random coefficients model
of the preferences. These preferences allow for a correlation in the coefficients, and
they are specifically modeled to allow for a correlation for hospitals within each
state. I find the health professionals’ preferences for hospitals to be significantly
heterogeneous.
Referring to these estimates, I show that moving from the previously-used de-
centralized system of lotteries to the current centralized mechanism has produced
significant welfare gains for physicians. From the fact that under the decentralized
mechanism health professionals were able to avoid positions that fell below their
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acceptance threshold, and simulating the outcome had the decentralized mechanism
still been in use, I obtain the average marginal utility a health professional would re-
quire to accept a position. I then simulate the outcome of the centralized mechanism
in the absence of the requirement that students accept the assignment determined
by the mechanism. I find that, given the choice, about 30% of physicians would
reject their hospital assignment, which implies that for the policy to be successful,
assignments must be mandatory.
Then I study the allocations’ efficiency from the viewpoint of health profes-
sionals. Allocations determined through use of the DA algorithm are known to be
strategy proof and respect priorities. However, these characteristics constrain pos-
sible allocations and, therefore, (possibly) they entail welfare costs. I show that the
respect priorities component is not very costly in terms of average welfare. Thus, I
show that under several mechanisms all priorities are respected. I also show that the
cost of strategy-proofness is of the first order. Slight deviations can result in welfare
gains of up to 12%. This reflects the fact that the preferences of health professionals
include all possible hospitals.
I also show that in case of the physicians market, using a random tie-break
rather than a merit-based one was a good policy decision. The former would have
allocated the best physicians to the most desirable positions, leaving those located
further away with worse physicians (as measured by the results of their end-of study-
exams). Doing a merit-based tie-break would benefit most of the other health pro-
fessions, which face significant congestion (i.e., their ratios of health professionals
to positions are very high). Behind this fact is the intuition that the less attractive
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health professionals would have a greater chance of not being assigned.
Finally, in chapter 3, show there is no evidence that manipulable mechanisms,
like the one used in Boston and the one currently used in New Haven to allocate stu-
dents to schools, in the setting of the Compulsory Social Service will result efficiency
gains. This is further evidence that when preferences are significantly heterogeneous,
the allocations when determined using the Deferred Acceptance algorithm achieve
a high efficiency.
There are other alternatives that I plan to study in the future. One of the
things that makes this setting interesting is the fact that the allocation is centralized
but the wages are determined in a decentralized way. In the future I plan to study
how the allocation would change if the wages are determined in a centralized way,
i.e. they are determined by the Ministry of Health. This opens the possibility
of capturing the intensity of preferences and thus determine the allocation in a
more efficient way. In particular I will explore what the Vickrey-Clarkes-Groove
mechanism outcome is in the setting at hand. This will not only be interesting in
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Figure A.1: Travel distance from hospital to graduation (km)
The understanding of nonlinear processes in optical fibers is crucial towards
extending the capabilities of modern optical communication systems based on wave-
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length division multiplexing (WDM), where each communication channel is repre-
sented by a unique wavelength. One of the nonlinear processes that limits the in-
formation carrying capacity of a WDM system is four-wave mixing (FWM), which
causes cross-talk between neighboring channels. This places a lower limit on the
wavelength separation between adjacent channels and an upper limit on the input
power in each channel. In this study, we describe a process by which the evolution
of FWM processes in an optical fiber can be used to estimate the inhomogeneities
in the fiber core material, in particular the fluctuations in the linear refractive index
of the fiber core.
A.2 Single vs Multiple Tie-Break
I use different algorithms proposed in the literature and compare their ef-
ficiency, as measured by average welfare, with the one resulting from the imple-
mented mechanism. In order to make our results comparable with the results in
the school choice literature (e.g. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009), He et al. (2012),
and Calsamiglia et al. (2014)) I compare the efficiency of the allocation as if the
implemented algorithm used only the reported preferred hospitals. I will refer to it
as the DA allocation.
It is important outline that the implemented algorithm with these character-
istics is strategy proof and respects priorities. Also, the priority structure of the
hospitals is so coarse that the mechanism has a significant randomness, i.e. it re-
lies a lot on the single tie-breaks. Define a matching µ = µ′ iff µ(i) = µ′(i) for
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every i ∈ P . I conducted 1’000,000 simulations of the DA allocation and found all
resulting matchings being different.
The first algorithm I compare DA with is the Top Trading Cycles or TTC
proposed initially by Shapley and Scarf (1974) and in the school choice setting by
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003). This algorithm is strategy proof and efficient.
Hence, comparing DA with TTC yields a measure of how costly it is in terms of
efficiency the respecting priorities property. I find that the welfare actually decreases
for the allocation of physicians and nurses. For the other two professions the gains
from TTC are slightly higher.
The next algorithm I compare DA with is the Student(Professional) Optimal
Stable Match or SOSM proposed by Erdil and Ergin (2008). The single tie break
used can generate welfare decreasing cycles. Comparing this algorithm with DA
gives a measure of how much welfare is lost on average due to this welfare reducing
cycles. I find that there are small welfare gains when moving from DA to SOSM in
every profession there are some potential gains from using this mechanism.
Another proposed modification in the literature is moving from a single tie-
break to a multiple tie-break, i.e. instead of having the same tie-break for all hospi-
tals allowing each hospital to have their own. Ashlagi et al. (2015) show that when
comparing the allocations resulting from DA under single and multiple tie-breaking
rules, the former has more subjects allocated at the firsts positions and very lasts
positions while the latter tends to allocate more concentrated on the middle. Our
results coincide with their results (as shown in table A.1). In the particular case I
are studying I find that moving from the single tie-break to the multiple one induces
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Avg Welfare Med-Lab Nursery Med-Doc Dentists
Single Tie-Break
DA STB 3.53 4.39 5.43 4.38
MLDA STB 3.96 4.85 5.56 5.14
SOSM STB 3.92 4.47 5.44 4.48
TTC STB 3.96 4.50 5.38 4.60
MLTTC STB 4.21 4.91 5.59 5.28
Multiple Tie-Break
DA STB 3.19 4.22 5.09 4.27
MLDA MTB 3.65 4.72 5.12 5.20
SOSM MTB 3.78 4.55 5.84 4.61
TTC MTB 3.94 4.56 5.42 4.62
MLTTC MTB 4.32 4.98 5.56 5.22
Table A.1: Comparing Different Algorithms
a welfare loss for all professions.
I compare all of the aforementioned mechanisms under the single and multiple
tie-breaking rules. As shown by Pathak and Sethuraman (2011) I find no difference
in the TTC ’s welfare between the two. For the other mechanisms I consistently find
that the single tie-break is superior in welfare than the multiple tie-break.
Finally, I modify the compare the DA with the Augmented Choice Deferred
Acceptance (or ACDA) proposed by (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2011). This algorithm
ideally should ask the professionals at which positions they would like to have an
additional advantage in the tie-break. They show how this mechanism is strategy
proof. I first calculate the probability of being assigned at each hospital for every
professional under DA. This is done through a computation of 10,000 simulations.
Then the additional advantage in the tie-break is given to each professional in their
most likely hospital. I define this algorithm as Most Likely Deferred Acceptance.
I find this algorithm produces a welfare gain of in cases relative to the Deferred
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Acceptance. However, the welfare gains relative to the TTC are ambiguous. Inter-
estingly, the resulting allocation first order stochastically dominates the allocation
and results in an increase of almost 2% in the allocated professionals. Interestingly,
following the same principle with the TTC I find once again that it procedure, i.e.
giving a higher to the priority in the tie-break to the most likely alternative, results
in similar welfare gains and a first order stochastic improvement.
A.3 Complete Table of Estimates
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Med-Lab Nursing Med-Docs Dentists
Means Gender
Wage
1 1 1 1
Travel Distance Origin
F -1.413 -1.863 -2.455 -1.444
M -1.192 -1.417 -1.798 -1.413
Travel Distance Graduation
F -0.532 -1.626 -1.656 -0.694
M -0.708 -3.024 -1.511 -0.028
UBN-Index
F -0.056 -0.114 -0.141 -0.083
M -0.023 -0.108 -0.118 -0.109
Coca
F -1.419 -0.644 -1.095 -1.124
M -0.147 -2.013 -0.997 -0.338
Living Place
F 0.866 0.256 0.577 0.587
M 0.163 0.882 0.179 0.541
Weekends Shift
F -2.296 -0.555 -0.176 -1.231
M -0.001 -0.382 -0.114 -0.031






F 1.506 1.427 2.430) 1.244
M 1.875 2.202 1.542 1.455
Travel Distance Graduation
F 1.265 2.068 1.862 1.131
M 1.358 2.157 2.736 0.237
UBN-Index
F 0.237 0.667 0.178 0.261
M 0.214 0.603 0.191 0.470
Coca
F 1.630 1.102 1.940 1.252
M 0.568 2.291 0.875 1.012
Living Place
F 1.111 0.663 0.491 1.016
M 0.585 1.254 0.418 0.942
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Med-Lab Nursing Med-Docs Dentists
Weekends Shift
F 2.276 1.028 0.414 1.297
M 0.037 0.779 0.329 0.202




Antioquia 3.613 3.180 2.443 2.250
Atlantico 2.599 2.313 0.993
Bogota 4.127 2.504 2.415 3.531
Bolivar 2.659 1.958 5.473 2.377
Boyaca 3.145 1.550 1.011 2.631
Caldas 2.022 2.482 1.739 2.266
Caqueta 2.383 1.571 1.995
Cauca 1.924 1.912 2.026
Cesar 2.563 1.948 1.678 1.575
Cordoba 3.510 1.875 0.568 1.949
Cundinamarca 2.543 2.005 1.300 2.041
Choco 2.569 1.937 0.833
Huila 2.606 1.721 1.280 2.237
La Guajira 2.047 1.808 2.607 1.703
Magdalena 2.233 1.872 1.110 3.749
Meta 1.926 0.948 1.676
Narino 2.419 3.917 1.725 2.189
N. De Santander 2.705 2.160 0.775 1.707
Quindio 2.781
Risaralda 3.013 1.904
Santander 3.890 2.537 1.253 2.292
Sucre 3.008 2.355 2.797
Tolima 2.074 1.707 0.499 1.675
Valle del Cauca 3.758 3.163 4.418 1.965
Arauca 3.227 2.341 2.395 1.826
Casanare 2.597 1.774 0.776 1.515
Putumayo 2.346 2.579 2.415 2.369
San Andres 5.377
Amazonas 2.527 1.939 4.450 2.610
Guainia 2.705 1.706 2.587
Guaviare 2.112 0.768
Vaupes 0.718
Table A.2: Preference Estimates of Health Professionals
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Calsamiglia, Caterina, Chao Fu, Maia Güell, et al. (2014), “Structural estimation of
a model of school choices: The boston mechanism vs. its alternatives.” Technical
report.
Chen, Yan and Onur Kesten (2017), “Chinese college admissions and school choice
reforms: A theoretical analysis.” Journal of Political Economy, 125, 99–139.
Erdil, Aytek and Haluk Ergin (2008), “What’s the matter with tie-breaking? im-
proving efficiency in school choice.” The American Economic Review, 98, 669–689.
Gale, David and Lloyd S Shapley (1962), “College admissions and the stability of
marriage.” The American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9–15.
Haeringer, Guillaume and Flip Klijn (2009), “Constrained school choice.” Journal
of Economic Theory, 144, 1921–1947.
Hastings, Justine, Thomas J Kane, and Douglas O Staiger (2009), “Heterogeneous
preferences and the efficacy of public school choice.” NBER Working Paper, 2145,
1–46.
He, Yinghua et al. (2012), “Gaming the boston school choice mechanism in beijing.”
Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers, 12–345.
Kamada, Yuichiro and Fuhito Kojima (2015), “Efficient matching under distribu-
tional constraints: Theory and applications.” American Economic Review, 105,
67–99, URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20101552.
Kapor, Adam, Christopher A Neilson, Seth D Zimmerman, et al. (2017), “Hetero-
geneous beliefs and school choice mechanisms.” Technical report.
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